How can social cohesion enhance the protection and preservation of cultural and religious heritage?

The Orthodox Monastery near the town of Decan, in Kosovo, has been a subject of much controversy in recent weeks. This is not the first time that the Manastiri i Decanit/Manastir Visoki Dečani has caused such a stir; the difference this time is that the public discourse around it has reached various levels of society in Kosovo and beyond. This polarized dispute, which could easily escalate, has deep roots. But its proximate cause is Europa Nostra’s decision in April 2021 to add the monastery to the list of the seven most endangered monuments in Europe.

Founded more than 50 years ago, this representative heritage organization has members in over 40 countries. Part of its mission is ‘to be a forceful advocate of heritage – with its multiple benefits for our economy, society, culture and the environment – towards policy-makers at all levels of governance: local, regional, national, European and on a global scale.’ Europa Nostra’s statements on its values include formulations such as ‘cultural heritage is not a relic of the past; it is a relevant, useful and accessible part of today and tomorrow’ and ‘cultural heritage is complex and multi-layered and therefore does not belong to one cultural group or nation, but instead belongs to all Europeans’. Indeed – these are accurate statements that should be respected fully by all stakeholders, internally and externally.

Europa Nostra’s decision to add the Decan Monastery to its list of the seven most endangered cultural heritage sites in Europe sparked fierce reaction from Kosovo’s institutions and civil society organizations, central and local. Kosovo’s president and prime minister jointly issued a letter addressed to the leadership of the organization offering arguments as to why the monastery is not endangered. They argue that there are many inaccuracies in the nomination criteria, and that the government of Serbia has profoundly politicized and instrumentalized the issue as part of its efforts to undermine Kosovo’s statehood at home and abroad. They also accuse Serbia of disguising its main aim – that of attempting to include the issue of Serbian cultural and religious heritage on the agenda of the next phase of talks between Kosovo and Serbia. According to Kosovo institutions and civil society groups, this issue has already been dealt with in the Ahtisaari Plan and, therefore, enshrined into the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo – an element of the statehood that the Serbian Orthodox Church (which owns the Decani Monastery) does not recognize.

In the past two weeks, Kosovo’s institutions have sent additional letters to the leadership of Europa Nostra and UNESCO. Kosovo’s foreign minister and minister of culture demand that Europa Nostra pays a visit to the site and speaks to all stakeholders, before revising a decision that they say is based on a ‘tendentious and unprofessional text by the nominating organization.’ Moreover, Kosovo institutions ask Europa Nostra to ‘requite the damage inflicted on the reputation of Kosovo.’ In the same vein, the three highest institutional leaders jointly signed a letter to the UNESCO leadership asking for Kosovo to be given stewardship of Serbian Orthodox World Heritage monuments on its territory. An additional letter penned by the minister of culture was also addressed to the nominating organization, Future for Religious Heritage, to request information about the origin of the nomination.

Forty civil society organizations in Kosovo, most of them run by Kosovo Albanians, issued a public letter expressing ‘deep concern’ about the monastery’s inclusion on the list. They argue that the decision has been taken on the basis of information provided by one party only, with the aim of making the issue of Serbian cultural heritage in Kosovo part of the negotiation between Pristina and Belgrade – and thereby helping the Serbian Orthodox Church gain the extraterritorial status it has sought for years. Like Kosovo institutions, these civil society organizations also invite Europa Nostra to visit Kosovo and establish facts on the ground and assess the level of security surrounding the monastery – including through the consultations with local and international security institutions who have been in charge of the protection of Serbian cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. The organizations rightly argue that groups such as Europa Nostra should be ‘dedicated to the protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo in order for it to serve as a bridge of reconciliation in Kosovo’ – a process that has stalled badly, despite the fact that more than 20 years have passed since the end of the war.

The Decani branch of Ali Hadri, the League of Kosovo Historians, has described the Constitutional Court’s 2016 decision on property issues surrounding the monastery as ‘scandalous’. The organization said the decision should not be implemented as it would affirm Serbian laws of the 1990s (which most Kosovo Albanians regard as highly discriminatory) that returned to the church parts of the land previously nationalized by the communist authorities in 1946. Ali Hadri also called on Quint countries not to ask for its implementation – referring to the countries’ recent statement on the full implementation of the 2016 court decision, which the clergy of the monastery has been arguing about for years. The head of Ali Hadri said that the implementation of this decision could worsen the situation on the ground and thereby incite ‘acts of radicalization’ through protests, in direct contradiction of the implementation of the court’s decision. Such statements from the Quint countries and the Ali Hadri have become a yearly occurrence since at least 2019.

Europa Nostra and the Future for Religious Heritage sent a joint reply to Kosovo institutions last week, announcing that they would visit Kosovo and the monastery. They remarked that the information for the nomination was collected ‘in line with the highest professional standards that are required for nominations under this programme.’

Arguably, the status of Serbian cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo has been dealt with thoroughly during the status talks held under the auspices of the UN and led by the former president Martti Ahtisaari from 2005-2007. An entire chapter of the Ahtisaari Plan is dedicated to the protection of the churches in Kosovo. Security provisions to safeguard and protect the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo are detailed, as are the plans for the establishment of protective zones that would surround more than 40 key religious sites, including the historic center of Prizren, to ensure their dignity and development. Under the Ahtisaari Plan, the Serbian Orthodox Church is granted property rights and is exempt from taxes and customs duties. Furthermore, the Kosovo branch of the church is free to maintain links with that in Belgrade. Ahtisaari’s comprehensive proposal has been enshrined into the Constitution of Kosovo following its declaration of independence.

The clergy of the monastery in Decan have complained about a lack of security and of political will to implement the rule of law, especially with regard to the accommodation of the church property in Kosovo. And they continuously call for an extension and expansion of international protection. Kosovo’s leaders have responded that the monastery has privileged status and that its clergy pick and choose the rules that suit them without recognizing the reality on the ground or the statehood of Kosovo.

The recent controversy around the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo shows how the securitization and politicization of Serbian cultural and religious heritage in the country have exacerbated the situation and further separated the monasteries and their clergy from mainstream political and social life in Kosovo. There are no spaces for sincere dialogue between the church and its community, despite efforts to change this. The only dialogue of this kind is the one mediated by the international community, which pass on messages from the sides. This absence of a safe and stable space for interaction between the two communities has gravely harmed attempts to build mutual trust between Kosovo’s communities. While the church and the clergy feel ‘unsafe’ in Kosovo, their surrounding communities feel excluded from the heritage that they consider to be part of their cultural birthright. Statements such as those from the clergy that ‘Kosovars are trying to claim our heritage because they lack their own’ and the ones from the league of historians that ‘radicalized actions will follow in the form of protest’ will not help mend relations. On the contrary, they will cause additional conflict. Clear and open channels of communication between the Serbian Orthodox clergy and the communities are imperative to finding a sustainable solution that is acceptable to all. For the clergy and the communities to engage in open and healthy communication that helps them understand each other’s positions and needs, they will have to want to talk rather than engage in nationalist and hateful rhetoric.

If we were to literally interpret one of the values of Europa Nostra – ‘Cultural Heritage is complex and multi-layered and therefore does not belong to one cultural group or nation, but instead belongs to all Europeans’ – the natural solution to this problem would be found in between the Decani Monastery and the community in Decan, not in Prishtina or Belgrade, or the UNESCO headquarters in Paris.

Within Kosovo Collective Op-Ed series

Opinions expresses in this oped series do not necessarily represent those of the Balkan Trust for Democracy, the German Mashall Fund of the U.S. (BTD), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), or the U.S. Government. 

Project is supported by the Balkan Trust for Democracy of the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. and USAID.