Beyond sovereignty and reforms: Safeguarding Kosovo’s multi-ethnicity and promoting a civic identity

Kosovo is often regarded as a peace project, and for much of its existence, it has proven to be a successful one. Its foundation as an independent state is built on a combination of best Western values and ideas of modern governance, alongside post-Cold War policies aimed at promoting democracy to ensure peace, stability, and development in the region. A closer look at Kosovo’s constitution reveals an impressive commitment to establishing functional democratic institutions, an effective balance of powers, civil freedoms, and extended protections for ethnic communities. Kosovars can rightfully boast to their friends in the West about how modern and democratic Kosovo appears on paper. However, despite the legal framework and steady progress in democratic rankings, Kosovo faces significant challenges today. These stem primarily from the current government’s detachment from the core principles that underpin Kosovo’s statehood and its constitution. According to the latest Freedom House report, Kosovo’s overall democratic performance has remained steady compared to last year, continuing its upward trajectory, especially in terms of electoral democracy, where it ranks the highest in the region. The current government had pledged to reform the judiciary and fight corruption but has yet to achieve favorable results. When Vetëvendosje came to power in 2021, they vowed to “de-capture” the state from what they characterized as opposition control. However, some actions—such as the vetting process—have raised concerns about the democratic nature of these reforms and whether they reflect a deeper political polarization crisis in Kosovo. In addition, several issues have hampered the government’s democratic performance, including rising political polarization, which has affected the functioning of the parliament, increased tensions with Serbia and the north of Kosovo, and pressure from the EU and US regarding the dialogue on normalization with Serbia.

Beyond addressing much-needed democratic reforms, Kosovo must also defend its civic and multi-ethnic character, as this is not only a prerequisite for peace but also a crucial condition for achieving full international recognition. It has a strong legal foundation for doing so, and since 2008, Kosovo has successfully promoted and protected its core multi-ethnic values, ensuring the integration of ethnic communities into central and local institutions, along with effective representation in parliament. However, the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions in November 2022, which reversed years of progress in integrating Serb community, has significantly altered the landscape. Since then, inter-ethnic tensions have risen, primarily due to the government’s efforts to dismantle long-standing parallel structures and services in northern municipalities. These include Serbian banks, postal services, the use of the dinar currency, and more. The Kosovo government’s efforts to close down these parallel institutions mark progress in addressing the issue and limiting Belgrade’s leverage, though these actions fall outside the current dialogue framework. The establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM), agreed upon by both parties in the dialogue process in 2013 and 2023, is intended to facilitate a transition from informal autonomous structures funded by Belgrade to institutions that would work closely with central authorities under regulations that safeguard Kosovo’s sovereignty. However, the

agreement on the establishment of the ASM has not yet been implemented and there is little appetite from the Kosovo government to move on this issue before the upcoming elections, scheduled for early February 2025.

Meanwhile, Serbs living in northern Kosovo are growing increasingly impatient. Conversations with them reveal a deep sense of frustration toward the Kosovo government, combined with disappointment in Belgrade. Their personal stories are poignant, highlighting the challenges of daily life—from difficulties in receiving salaries or remittances to struggles with vaccinating their children. Albanians living in Mitrovica share similarly distressing accounts. Many feel unwelcome and unsafe, with cases of people being harassed or yelled at in the streets. Both communities long for a settlement that will end this ongoing nightmare and restore the conditions for peaceful cohabitation and reconciliation.

However, a solution does not appear imminent, as the Kosovo government refuses to acknowledge its share of responsibility in this situation and is likely to persist in its current course of action. While the crisis is unfolding within Kosovo’s territory, the government attributes the dire circumstances in the north solely to Belgrade’s policies. They claim victory for diminishing Belgrade’s influence in the north, a statement that holds true, though Kosovo may not be the sole force behind it (as Belgrade and international partners have quietly allowed it). The government justifies its actions as a defense of sovereignty, which is valid. However, these actions may also be considered unconstitutional, as they contradict many of the provisions in Chapter III of the constitution concerning the rights of communities.

When the Kosovo police shut down post offices and banks in the northern municipalities, it sends a discriminatory message and raises questions about the conformity of such actions with Kosovo’s constitution. These moves deepen the alienation of the Serb communities, diminishing their willingness to reintegrate into Kosovo’s institutions. They have already led to a growing distrust from Serb communities in Kosovo’s institutions, especially towards Kosovo police, and have amplified their calls for greater autonomy. The Serb communities are increasingly opposed to any concessions that fall short of the agreements made in Brussels regarding the establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities.

Since 2021, the Kosovo government’s actions in the north may have diminished Serbia’s influence. However, it is crucial that these actions avoid being discriminatory or creating an environment where Serbs feel unwelcome and start leaving Kosovo. Kosovo is not a mono-ethnic state, and it must avoid any steps that could lead in that direction. Moreover, the increased visibility of Albanian national flags and the emphasis on using the Albanian pronunciation of “Kosova” under this government sends the wrong message to other ethnic communities. While Kosovo’s right to defend its sovereignty is unquestionable, the manner in which it does so must align with both the Kosovo constitution and the agreements reached in the Brussels dialogue process. The use of national symbols is not prohibited, but the state has a responsibility to promote the values of modern-day Kosovo — fostering peace and coexistence by moving away from nationalistic rhetoric and focusing on building a civic identity. Much work remains to be done to ensure that citizens feel like Kosovars first, before identifying as Albanians or Serbs. If we were once moving closer to this goal, we are now further away from it than ever.