Addressing Structural Barriers to Kosovo Serb Integration

Kosovo’s journey to statehood has been a relentless pursuit of local ownership over internationally designed political institutions. Since the country assumed full control of its governance in 2012—following a period often described as ‘supervised independence’—Kosovo has grappled with the dual challenge of consolidating its sovereignty both internationally and domestically. Domestically, the government has faced the daunting task of creating favorable conditions for non-majority communities, particularly the Serbs, while addressing the deep-seated legacies of the past. This is an intricate endeavor that touches upon Kosovo’s future stability and sovereignty.

The ’facade’ of reconciliation in Kosovo

Transitional justice efforts in Kosovo from 1999 to 2021 have been extensively theorized and a common theme in these works is the international community’s historical neglect of placing transitional justice issues at the forefront of peace and dialogue talks. Over twenty years since the war, hopes for a breakthrough in inter-ethnic relations seem more elusive than ever. While the international community bears some responsibility for this impasse, the greater burden lies with Kosovo’s government and society to build an inclusive country.

Reconciliation must be seen as a fundamental outcome of transitional justice processes. Among scholarly debate, the assertion holds that reconciliation is but one potential objective of transitional justice. For Kosovo, it is the critical determinant of success for its internationally engineered power-sharing system. Yet, the international community has historically underemphasized reconciliation as a core element of the political framework.

This caveat is evident in two major initiatives: the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan and the Brussels-facilitated dialogue. The Ahtisaari Plan paved the way for Kosovo’s statehood and community rights protection mechanisms to ensure political participation and inclusive policymaking. Similarly, the Brussels dialogue aimed to, among others, integrate Kosovo Serbs into public institutions. However, both initiatives failed to prioritize reconciliation as a guiding principle, instead treating it as a secondary outcome that would naturally follow.

Thick and Thin Reconciliation

This flawed approach -highlighted in the Brussels dialogue and Ahtisaari Plan- views reconciliation as a byproduct of institutional design, which raises concerns about the future of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. Reconciliation is often interpreted as either “shallow/thin” or “deep/thick”. Thin reconciliation involves creating institutions that promote non-lethal coexistence among communities . In contrast, thick reconciliation requires individuals and groups to move beyond mere coexistence, addressing past harms, reversing structural marginalization, and building relationships based on mutual trust. Both the Ahtisaari Plan and the Brussels dialogue are examples of thin reconciliation, focusing on non-hostile coexistence rather than tackling the structural roots of inter-ethnic marginalization.

Community Rights Implementation and Structural Marginalization

In Kosovo, debates on the rule of law has always been tied to anti-corruption efforts and rooting out organized crime. However, the most important aspect of rule of law—ensuring a robust and sustainable implementation of sector-specific legal frameworks—has been largely ignored. This view has been consistent throughout the deliberation of Kosovo’s good governance progress and not only specific to community rights obligations. Despite a well-consolidated legal framework (with some cross-legal inconsistencies), the government of Kosovo has on numerous occasions stalled on ensuring comprehensive implementation and safeguards of community rights.

For the most part, it falls upon the responsibility of the Kosovo institutions to ensure that the inclusion of communities aligns with the standardization of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. Perhaps the biggest impediment to this is Kosovo Albanian perceptions of the instrumentalization of Kosovo Serbs. The general skepticism of Kosovo Albanians about the prospects for Kosovo Serb integration has long been subject to competing political narratives, often fueled and exacerbated by inter-party vested interests.

The assumption of ownership over the Kosovo Serbs by Serbia within the confines of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue has similarly shaped this skepticism. Implicit acts of aggression between Kosovo and Serbia at the negotiating table directly impact the level of alienation faced by non-majority communities in both countries. As such, the burden of reciprocal measures between the two countries is reflected in the indirect structural violence experienced by their respective ethnic communities.

Prospects of a ‘thick’ reconciliation in Kosovo

Addressing the structural challenges that facilitate the indirect violence targeting Kosovo Serbs is a pre-condition the government must recognize before deliberating on the future of inter-ethnic integration in Kosovo. The level of government implementation of the community rights framework in Kosovo directly correlates to the level of belonging Kosovo Serbs develop with Kosovo state institutions and symbols. In the absence of comprehensive implementation, Kosovo Serbs willingly or unwillingly support the maintenance of illegal parallel institutions in Kosovo.

While the question of the political representativeness of the Kosovo Serb electorate remains, it should be treated more as a cause of the institutional development of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue rather than active Kosovo Serb legitimization of ‘spoiler’ political parties- in this case the Serb List. Aspirations toward the institution of an institutional approach to thick reconciliation are far-fetched if the underlying cause of dis-integration is a perceived unwillingness of everyday Kosovo Serbs to participate in Kosovo institutions.

First and foremost, public institutions in Kosovo should build upon the necessary conditions for the comprehensive implementation of community rights. Once the conditions are met and the participation of Kosovo Serbs is comprehensively evaluated through a multi-level participation of civil society and international stakeholders, discussions on a sustained lack of willingness to integrate on the part of Kosovo Serbs can be further examined.

This in turn also leads to more fundamental discussions over the agency of Kosovo Serbs itself. The recent terrorist attack in the Kosovar village of Banjska has highlighted Serbia’s continued support to the destabilization of Kosovo and its flagrant noncompliance with recent strides made in the Brussels dialogue and Ohrid in particular. The identification of some of the perpetrators as Kosovo Serb nationals further deteriorates any positive outlook by the majority of Kosovo Albanians on the willingness of Kosovo Serbs to integrate within Kosovo. Similarly, recent Kosovo government actions relating to the restriction of the dinar was not a positive signal to the support for the sustainable livelihoods of Kosovar Serbs.

Concluding Remarks

The prospects of thick reconciliation in Kosovo might seem unrealistic given the present circumstances, but it is a long-term strategy that must be undertaken with commitment and urgency. Only by addressing the structural issues that divide communities can Kosovo ensure the long-term integration of Kosovo Serbs. Two necessary preconditions must be ensured as a priority in the coming mandate. First, the Kosovo government needs to have a detailed approach to integration which makes it more appealing to Kosovo Serbs than their active participation and legitimization parallel institutions. Second, Kosovo Serbs must recognize a future facilitated by their constitutionally enshrined rights and not be discouraged by Kosovo’s attempts to demask Serbia’s role as a spoiler of regional and bilateral peace and reconciliation.

This content was funded by a grant from the U.S. Embassy in Pristina. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the State Department.

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