The Association of Serb- Majority Municipalities: Between building and burning bridges

The Association of Serb- Majority Municipalities: Between building and burning bridges
21/07/2021

The ill-famed Association/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities came with the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia in April 2013. The so-called technical dialogue had started two years before, in March 2011, but neither Kosovo nor Serbia was ready to opt to sensitive issues. In August 2015, both countries agreed on the General Principles/ Main Elements of ASM, furthering the antagonism and ambiguity.  

This topic is so consumed and politicized that it is incredibly difficult to discuss it without ‘raising the tone.’ But let us move beyond the political discourse and consider the prospects of creating the ASM: Is ASM/ CSM more likely to build or burn bridges between the communities in Kosovo?! 

As the EU-led dialogue process started, Kosovo and Serbia committed to the normalization of relations between them. They agreed on several technical issues, hoping that each agreement would bring them one step closer to the European Union. Brought together by the same purpose, countries made many concessions, most of which came through the First Agreement of Principles in 2013 and then through the General Principles/ Main Elements of ASM in 2015. The latter recognized ASM as a legal entity of a distinct character with the right to exercise a full overview in delivering public functions and services in the areas of health, education, rural and urban planning, and economic development. This association would include the four northern and six southern Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo and would be dissolved only by the decision of its Assembly.  

Serbia portrayed ASM as the solution to all the problems of the Serb community in Kosovo. Based on this narrative, ASM would protect and promote the Serb community rights, particularly their access to health, education, and social benefits but would also enable a more effective exercise of their municipal competencies. Pictured as the perfect approach to integrate the northern Serbs into the system of Kosovo and to end the operation of Belgrade-led parallel structures, it gave rise to different opinions among the communities in Kosovo.  

The dual terminology used in the Agreement (Community for Serbia and Association for Kosovo) was the main engine to drive the polarization. By the formation of ASM, some would argue, we pave the way for reconciliation as Serbia abandons the partition idea. Others saw it as nothing but a ‘cover-up’ that does not contribute to the improvement of the situation but weakens the country internally. 

Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, some of the articles of the General Principles/ Main Elements of ASM do not entirely meet the constitutional standards, especially when it comes to its legal framework, objectives (especially the ambiguity of the term: exercises a full overview) the organizational structure (concerns for not reflecting diversity), relations with central authorities, budget, support, and final provisions. This decision created additional polarity on the issue. Serbia, for instance, seeing that ASM is perceived as unconstitutional, was even more persuasive and brought ASM at the center of the entire process. By contrast, Kosovo was willing to discuss everything but the Association.  

 The agreement explicitly notes that ASM is based on the European Charter of Local Self-Government. This Charter recognizes the right of local authorities ‘to associate for carrying out tasks of common interest but only under the conditions as provided by the law.’ It does not whatsoever call for an ethnic-based association of municipalities. ASM would jeopardize the core values and principles of our democracy.  

Kosovo’s fundamental act, or the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, through article 3, defines Kosovo as a multi-ethnic society. The principle of multi-ethnicity is laid down by the Ahtisaari Plan, according to which, the country would become an example of tolerance and reconciliation between all communities.  

The Kosovo Law on Local Self-Government calls for promoting coexistence and peace between their citizens and creating appropriate conditions enabling all communities to express, preserve, and develop their national, ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities. 

Based on the same law, municipalities already have full and exclusive powers as far as they concern the local interests, including the areas of local economic development, urban and rural planning, education, and health. When it comes to Serb-majority municipalities, the law already grants enhanced competencies in secondary health care for the municipalities of Mitrovicë/ North Mitrovica, Graçanicë/ Gračanica and Shtërpce/ Štrpce; enhanced competencies on higher education for the municipality of Mitrovicë/ North Mitrovica; and enhanced competencies in the area of Culture for all Serb-majority municipalities. Municipalities can cooperate with each other (to secure technical and financial assistance) when it comes to the areas of their competencies as well as the protection and promotion of their common interests. The forms of cooperation include partnerships and associations with other municipalities in Kosovo, but also cross-border partnerships with foreign municipalities or institutions (including those of Serbia). When it comes to regular communication with the Government of Kosovo, as the central authority, communities can exercise this right through the Consultative Council for Communities.  

Regardless of the misperceptions and/or the lack of knowledge, the current legal framework enables the Serb community to join their forces to improve the quality of services. It is the orchestrated belief that only with the establishment of an Association or Community of Serb-majority municipalities, in accordance with General Principles/Main Elements, the Serb community will benefit. In reality, neither does Serb nor Albanian population know what ASM really is or what the current legal framework already provides. Most are just victims of the political connotations that have colored their judgments. We must, therefore, ask ourselves whether ASM is more likely to serve the well-being of the Serb community in Kosovo or the interest of political elites in Serbia?! 

The north of Kosovo has been disconnected from the rest of the territory since the end of the conflict. With the implementation of the First Agreement of Principles in 2013, the Judicial, Police, and Civil Protection parallel structures were integrated into the institutions of Kosovo. However, when it comes to Health, Social Care, and Education, these services are financed through Serbia and provided by parallel institutions. The justification behind this continues to be the fact that Kosovo is unable to provide quality education, health, and social care. In a nutshell, the Serb community in Kosovo has a lack of trust in the institutions of Kosovo. 

Acknowledging this fact, there is a reasonable concern that by bringing the ASM to life, ethnic lines would be drawn, which would further disintegrate the southern municipalities. This leads us to believe that ASM could become a real threat to the already fragile ethnic situation in Kosovo.  

The United States and European Union are constantly pressuring Kosovo to implement the ASM as a no-alternative issue. They seem to be on pins and needles, especially after Kurti’s declarations to disregard the implementation of ASM. The Albanian population, however, does not want to reopen this topic. They stand behind the Constitutional Court’s decision, convinced that ASM would become another tier of governance between the local and central level, which is in disharmony with the principle of subsidiarity: offering the services closer to the citizens. 

In the given circumstances, it is crucial to come to an understanding. Parties need to find a workable solution, based on the available options, rather than follow some concept that endangers the system as well as the already fragile inter-community relations. To this end, the Serb-majority municipalities must pursue a model of cooperation that enables them to strengthen ties with both Belgrade and Pristina. This is the most effective path to integration, development, and long-term stability. Correspondingly, Kosovo must increase the efforts of promoting communities’ rights in practice. 

Kosovo should focus on building bridges of cooperation, especially when it comes to the northern part. An association as such could rather build walls or destroy any attempt towards collaboration, reconciliation, and coexistence. It could disintegrate the Serb population. And that is neither in the interest of Serb nor Albanian communities in Kosovo. The Serb community in Kosovo is adamant that ASM would be the solution to all their problems and would serve as a tool for integration. What they do not take into account is that ASM could elevate the inter-ethnic tensions.  

Moreover, if the Serb community is granted this level of autonomy, what about the rest of the communities in Kosovo? Kosovo is not a bi-ethnic country. ASM could become a real threat to the principle of diversity because while these ten municipalities include a Serb-majority population, they still have other minorities, Albanian, Roma, Gorani, or Bosniak.  

When we detach ourselves from the political narratives, we get to objectively consider the rationale of creating a one-ethnicity Association/Community. Kosovo is a small country that is supposed to become a model of a multi-ethnic coexistence; even our flag reflects on this element.  

If we want sustainable solutions, we need to do some proactive thinking. Concepts of ethnically homogenous nations belong to the last century. So, instead of pursuing outdated concepts, let us embrace the new values and work towards this ethnically diverse future in front of us. 

Within Kosovo Collective Op-Ed series

Opinions expresses in this oped series do not necessarily represent those of the Balkan Trust for Democracy, the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. (BTD), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), or the U.S. Government. 

Project is supported by the Balkan Trust for Democracy of the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. and USAID.

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Diona Grezda

Diona Grezda is a researcher at Balkans Policy Research Group (BPRG). She holds a BA degree in Law from the University of Prishtina and a MA degree in International Relations from the University of Szeged. 

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