The KPDS Report 2025 summarizes key discussions and insights from the 4th Kosovo Peace and Democracy Summit, examining disinformation, democratic backsliding, and the role of dialogue and civil society in strengthening democratic resilience in the Western Balkan
Trade barriers are among the most common instruments of economic protectionism, but in politically unstable environments they become tools of political pressure. In Kosovo, this phenomenon is evident in the measures that local authorities in Pristina have introduced against goods from central Serbia. From the 100% tariffs imposed at the end of 2018 to the complete import ban in 2023, trade has been used as an instrument of political signaling rather than a neutral channel of economic exchange.1
The key problem lies in the fact that the measures directly affected the Serbian com- munity in Kosovo, which depends on a stable inflow of basic foodstuffs, medicines, and consumables. In practice, disruptions in supply chains have caused shortages, rising prices, and uncertainty in public services such as pharmacies and health cen- ters. Small shops, which form the backbone of the local economy, have faced clo- sure due to increased costs and uncertainty. These consequences are not short-term; rather, they create sustained pressure on the economic and social survival of the Ser- bian community.
This concerns thousands of citizens whose everyday lives depend on the availability of goods. If the problem is not resolved, there is a risk of irreversible consequences: the permanent loss of local trading networks, a deterioration in health due to shortag- es of medicines, and a heightened sense of isolation and insecurity. In the long term, this could weaken social cohesion and trust in any institutional processes.
The problem also goes beyond the local level. It encompasses the broader framework of regional integration (CEFTA, European processes), as well as trust in international actors mandated to oversee the implementation of agreements. If trade continues to be used as an instrument of politics, this undermines regional stability and every effort toward the normalization of relations.
This paper proceeds from the standpoint that trade must not be a means of politi- cal blackmail. It focuses on analyzing the mechanisms of the politicization of trade, identifying its economic, social, and political consequences, and formulating feasible recommendations that can provide a minimum of predictability and security for the Serbian community in Kosovo.
Lake Gazivode stands as one of the most critical yet contested resources in the West- ern Balkans. Supplying water, electricity, and ecological stability to communities in both Kosovo and Serbia, it embodies overlapping technical, political, and security dimen- sions. This paper examines the Gazivode problem as a convergence of political dead- lock, institutional ambiguity, infrastructural vulnerability, ecological fragility, and social dependence. Building on analyses by multiple sources the study maps the multi-layered challenges and evaluates possible pathways for sustainable management. Proposed solutions include short-term technical modernization under the supervision of neutral third parties, joint monitoring mechanisms that avoid the recognition trap, ecological cooperation through international platforms, scenario planning for crisis situations, and long-term, but currently aspirational, institutionalization. The paper argues that while no single solution is sufficient, combining technical improvements, ecological adaptation, and incremental confidence-building offers the best chance of transforming Gazivode from a potential flashpoint into a stabilizing resource.
This policy brief addresses a critical research question: Why is there a significant dis- parity in the participation and success rates of young Kosovo Serbs compared to their Kosovo Albanian counterparts in government-sponsored employment programs facil- itated by the Republic of Kosovo’s Employment Agency? This question is paramount for Kosovo’s social cohesion, economic stability, and the long-term integration of all its communities. As the government rolls out large-scale initiatives like ”Superpuna,” a wage-subsidy scheme for youth, and ”Qeveria për Familjet,” designed to support fam- ilies with no employed members, ensuring equitable access and outcomes for all cit- izens is not just a matter of policy effectiveness but a cornerstone of building a truly multi-ethnic and democratic state.
The issue directly affects the economic prospects and social mobility of young Serbs, a community crucial to Kosovo’s future. Failure to integrate this demographic into the formal labor market risks deepening inter-ethnic divides, fostering economic disenfran- chisement, and potentially fueling outward migration. For the government and its inter- national partners, this disparity represents a significant challenge to the stated goals of inclusive development and good governance. While existing reports have addressed youth unemployment in general,this brief focuses specifically on the structural and state-level barriers that exclude young Serbs from public programs. It argues that the lower participation and success rates among young Serbs are not arbitrary but are the result of systemic barriers. These include a lack of targeted, linguistically appropriate outreach, inequitable access to vocational training programs, and a lower level of trust in public institutions. Addressing these structural issues is essential for unlocking the full economic potential of all of Kosovo’s youth and ensuring that government employ- ment schemes achieve their intended universal impact.
The relationship between Belgrade and Pristina is still shaped by an unresolved past: the way events from 1998–1999 are remembered and interpreted is crucial for political trust and ev- eryday coexistence. Specific cases such as the events in the village of Račak (January 1999)— described by some as a massacre of civilians and by others as the outcome of an armed clash and political manipulation—remain points of deep disagreement, both in academic research and in public debates.1 Similarly, the 1999 NATO bombing holds a place of trauma and vio- lation of sovereignty in Serbian memory, while in the Albanian narrative it is often seen as a necessary protection of civilians under repression. These opposing interpretations are not confined to textbooks and archives—they spill into everyday speech and influence how young people perceive themselves, “the others,” and the possibility of cooperation.
Digital networks accelerate and amplify this dynamic. Young people in Serbia and in Koso- vo and Metohija today predominantly learn about the past through TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube, where algorithms encourage the virality of content that elicits a strong emotional response, thereby fueling echo chambers: young people are more likely to see confirmations of their existing beliefs than opposing arguments. 2 The experience of 2020 made this visible during the pandemic: conspiracy theories (from “5G networks spread the virus” to “interna- tional actors are using the crisis to subjugate the region”) spread faster than fact-checks, influencing attitudes and trust in institutions.3 This pattern—the rapid circulation of simplified, emotive, and often inaccurate narratives—maps onto topics from the 1990s as well.
Why is this a policy problem rather than merely a social phenomenon? Because digitally shaped narratives directly influence political behavior and society’s capacity for dialogue. If the online space is left to disinformation and toxic echo chambers, young people become carriers of prolonged divisions: willingness for encounter, joint projects, and trust in institu- tions decreases. Conversely, if investment is made in the digital space through media and digital literacy, moderated cross-border cooperation, and safety protocols for participants, that same space can become a training ground for learning multi-perspectivity, for co-creat- ing content, and for moving from “parallel truths” to work with facts. This policy paper starts precisely from that premise: how to empower young people—here understood as high-school students (15–18), university students (18–24), and young activists/creators (20–29)—to criti- cally distinguish facts from interpretations, and how to turn digital networks from amplifiers of polarization into infrastructure for dialogue and sustainable reconciliation.
It often sounds like a cliché to say that municipalities are the first door where citizens can address their problems, but when taken seriously, this helps us understand the centrality of local governance and the way municipalities operate. The placement of a parking lot can affect the daily routine of a parent waiting for their child after school; the bus schedule can reshape how a working day is organized; or a few more or less seconds at a traffic light can prove decisive in an emergency. These seemingly small decisions illustrate the importance of municipalities in shaping citizens’ everyday lives and their trust in institutions.
The same logic applies to interethnic coexistence: the way institutions function, how representative and present municipalities are in dialogue processes, how inclusive pol- icies are designed and implemented, and the quality of municipal programs all have a direct impact on building trust and fostering cooperation between communities.
In the context of normalization between Serbia and Kosovo, however, the presence of municipalities at the negotiating table has always been absent. Although municipalities are the frontline of service delivery and citizen trust, they remain excluded from the EU-facilitated dialogue, the main channel for normalization between the two countries. Agreements often touch directly on municipal competences, such as policing, civil reg- istries, and energy, yet municipalities are not visibly represented at the table.
The guiding question of this policy brief is therefore: To what extent have municipali- ties been present in the EU-facilitated dialogue, and what does their absence mean for implementation and legitimacy? This question is essential for advancing an inclusive and multiethnic society in Kosovo, as local actors stand at the frontline of interethnic relations. For citizens, municipal decisions are not merely technical; they shape daily life and perceptions of shared spaces and social security. For minority communities in particular, the functionality of these mechanisms is directly linked to fair representation and the protection of rights.
This policy brief argues that the decentralization of dialogue in Kosovo can serve as a genuine tool for integration only if the role and presence of municipalities are strength- ened and directly represented in discussions between the two states. The international community especially the European Union as the main facilitator of the dialogue should ensure greater municipal involvement in the negotiation process. Bringing municipalities closer to the drafting of agreements would not only improve their practicality and en- forceability on the ground but also strengthen the legitimacy of the dialogue by making it more responsive to citizens’ everyday needs.
With respect to methodology, this policy brief relies exclusively on document analysis as its research method. The analysis covers both primary and secondary sources in order to trace how municipalities have (or have not) been included in the EU-facilitated dia- logue and how their absence affects implementation.
• Primary sources include official agreements reached between Kosovo and Serbia from 2011 to 2023, as published by the European Union, the Government of Kosovo, and the Government of Serbia. In addition, EU press releases and statements from the European External Action Service (EEAS) were examined to capture the official framing of the dialogue process.
• Secondary sources consist of reports, policy papers, and analyses produced by civil society organizations and think tanks such as the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS), Belgrade Centre for Security Policy CSP), the Balkans Policy Research Group (BPRG), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), and other relevant actors.
Together, these sources provide the basis for assessing both the formal role assigned to municipalities in dialogue-related agreements and the broader perceptions of their absence in shaping implementation and legitimacy on the ground.