The EU proposed agreement for Kosovo and Serbia helps both countries move in the right direction and it is good for the region  

On March 18 the Kosovan and Serbian leaders will meet in Ohrid, North Macedonia to discuss the EU proposed “Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia”, as well as the implementation roadmap which is annexed to the agreement. In another lake, not far from Ohrid, in 2018 Greece and North Macedonia signed the historic Prespa Agreement, that led to NATO membership, and decisive progress in the European integration process, until France put the brakes on in October of 2019, blocking the start of the formal accession talks between the EU and North Macedonia.  

Based on the Prishtina chatter, it seems that the text of the agreement itself is not the most serious point of contention – at least between the leaders – but rather the implementation roadmap, and more precisely, the sequence of the events in the roadmap. In other words, when and what kind of steps, each party is expected to take towards implementation of the obligations they assume under the agreement. This refers to, among others, activities such as when the Joint Committee is established, recognition of the national symbols and documents, or when the management team is convened to draft-status of the association of Serb-majority municipalities is moved forward. It would be very unfortunate and a testament of the current “Trumpian political era” in our region, if both leaders fail to reach the EU proposed agreement because they could not agree on the sequence of the events for implementation.  

The reasons why there might be concerns over the implementation roadmap, and the sequencing of the events are obvious, and stem from the deep distrust between the two leaders, which was a constant feature of the normalization dialogue since it started in 2011. Kosovo government perhaps fears that if it makes concrete steps towards establishment of the ASM, before Serbia makes good on its commitments in the agreement, it would lose any leverage over the process, and so on and so forth. In this context, hopefully the EU and other actors have made it clear, that this is not business as usual, with respect to implementation of agreement.  

There were also other important concerns from Kosovo’s perspective with respect to the outcomes of the EU proposed agreement, mainly if it will lead to recognition of Kosovo from the five EU member States (Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece)? This is a major issue, because without changes in the position of the five non-recognizers, Kosovo’s aspiration for membership in NATO and the EU remain uncertain. In addition to this, if the five non-recognizers were to change position, this would make formal recognition from Serbia, less relevant to Kosovo. It would changes the currency of recognition by Serbia, by turning it, mainly an issue between EU and Serbia, rather than  as it is now between Kosovo and Serbia.  

The discussions in Kosovo suggests that only Greece is highly likely to move towards recognition after the agreement is signed, while there is caution or pessimism about Slovakia and Romania, whereas Cyprus and Spain are seen as most likely not to change position, but there is some good news in this regard. After the meeting between Prime Minister Kurti and President Vucic on February 27, during the press remarks EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, said that the EU proposed agreement was endorsed by all 27 member States, which means also the five non-recognizers. Mr. Borell said “This is a proposal approved by the European Council: 27 Member States supported it”. This is a crucial positive news for Kosovo, as it means that potentially all five non-recognizers might change their position, if the agreement is signed. It will be up to the European Commission and Kosovo to follow-up and make good on the endorsement of the agreement by all. It would have been better, for Kosovo to insists that the European Council endorses the agreement after it is signed, but this is also a good development.   

Also, it would not be rational on the part of Cyprus and Spain, or others as well, to continue to oppose Kosovo’s independence, following the signing of the agreement by the two sides, that clearly implies a practical or working recognition of Kosovo’s status on the part of Serbia. In this context, if Spain and Cyprus cannot move towards formal recognition, they should at least adopt a similar policy of de-facto recognition or working recognition, in order not to block Kosovo’s accession process in the EU and NATO.  

Other concerns, in a larger context, have to do with the EU’s agency as a security actor, and how the proposed agreement is more about managing the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, rather than resolving it. However, from my reading, it seems this is an area where member States are more at fault, rather than the EU itself and its institutions. The agency of the EU, in some cases seems to be limited by interests, agendas or just different approaches of member States, and this in few occasions has significantly undermined the credibility of the Union in the Western Balkans, such as when accession talks were blocked for North Macedonia in 2019, or how Kosovo was treated in the visa liberalization process. It would be scandalous, if the agreement is signed by leaders on March 18, but the EU finds it difficult to move on its end to bring the countries closer in the integration process, or remain distanced in the implementation.   

In 2010 the European Union (EU) was tasked by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly “to facilitate a process of dialogue between the parties”, and hopefully March 18, marks a crucial steps towards fulfillment of the objective of the normalization dialogue. Citizens in both countries, need their leaders to agree, so the rest can move forward. Therefore, fingers crossed that leaders from Kosovo and Serbia reach a compromise and sign the EU proposed agreement.  

Author is head of research at the Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS) 

This Op-ed is published as part of the project “Strengthening Youth Civic Participation in Political Processes” implemented by New Social Initiative (NSI) funded by National Endowment for Democracy (NED).