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Ethnization of Kosovo Police: Erosion of Ahtisaari's Basis of a Civic and Multiethnic Institution

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In North Mitrovica, December 2024



Ethnization of Kosovo Police: Erosion of Ahtisaari's Basis of a Civic and Multiethnic Institution

Summary

In the last three years in Kosovo, a trend has been observed on social networks, especially on TikTok, where members of the Kosovo Police promote Albanian ethnonationalism, contrary to the Constitution and legislation in force.

- **By analyzing the legislation**, it has been established that such behavior on social networks violates at least 13 articles of the secondary act on discipline, as well as the Constitution of Kosovo and the laws governing Kosovo's institutions as civic and multiethnic.
- **By analyzing TikTok content** from early November 2024, which included a cumulative search of hashtags related to the Kosovo Police, it was found that there are over 14,000 posts related to it. For example, just the hashtag #njesiaspecialekosoves (special unit of Kosovo) has over 4,000 posts that generated over 270 million views.
- **The ethnonationalist musical background** used in posts containing most of the problematic content, which is measured in thousands, characterizes the security apparatus as an enforcer of Albanian nationalist goals, rather than as an enforcer of Ahtisaari's vision of Kosovo.
- **As evidence** of this illegal and nationalist practice that undermines the multiethnic and civic character of the security apparatus, the authors provided over 140 photographs showing more than 300 police officers using illegal emblems and symbols, flags, or gestures that clearly identify their ethnic affiliation and emphasize their nationalist political views or glorify the concept of extrajudicial "justice."

Although the trend pointed out here is widespread in Kosovo, public recognition of the harmfulness of this practice, condemnation, and sanctions for such behavior are lacking. The institutions most responsible for preventing such phenomena, the Kosovo Police Inspectorate, and international missions with monitoring status, such as the European Union Rule of Law Mission – EULEX, have not reacted in the last three years since the expansion of this trend.

Introduction

In deeply divided (post-)conflict societies, controversial ethno-nationalist¹ behavior by members of institutions from the dominant group, especially within the security apparatus—such as the army and police—is perceived as inappropriate, provocative, and threatening by the minority community.

¹ Hermann Kohn differentiates between ethnic nationalism (based on common heritage, language, culture and history) and civic nationalism (based on common political values, institutions and citizenship). According to Kohn, ethnic nationalism has a tendency to be exclusive and is often tied to a single ethnic group, while civic nationalism can be more inclusive and focused on common political loyalty or ideals, instead of ethnic background.

Kohn, H. (1944). *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background*. Macmillan.

The increased presence of heavily armed units of the Kosovo Police (KP) in the Serb-majority north Kosovo, predominantly composed of Albanians, has been a trend for several years², intensifying since late February 2022³. From this point onward, the Government of Kosovo began constructing police infrastructure, including bases and checkpoints, in this majority-Serb region, illegally expropriating⁴ land owned by local Serbs for these purposes.⁵ Concurrently, heavily armed police units, predominantly from the Albanian community, were actively deployed, violating constitutional⁶ principles of proportional representation and the 2013 "Brussels Agreement."⁷ These agreements guaranteed that the police's composition would reflect the local population's demographic structure, leading to the establishment of a special regional command ("Region North") for four majority-Serb municipalities.

Tensions throughout 2022 were marked by the deployment of police units overtaking local governance responsibilities, including the "Region North," whose discriminatory behavior was repeatedly criticized by the Serb majority population.⁸⁹ Additionally, controversial decisions by Kosovo authorities, made outside the negotiation framework—such as vehicle registration processes—further escalated tensions.

Tensions culminated in November of that year with the collective withdrawal of Serbs from Kosovo institutions in the North, including the police structures, creating an institutional void. The Government of Kosovo attempted to fill this void by deploying predominantly Albanian officers from other regions to the North, thereby establishing an almost entirely "Albanian" composition of the KP in the northern municipalities. For the first time, in addition

² Open initiative, "Solving accumulated problems through dialogue," *Press release*, 3 October, 2023: <https://newsocialinitiative.org/statement/press-release-solving-accumulated-problems-through-dialogue/>

³ KoSSev, "Kosovo Police Erects Concrete Barriers on Brnjak Bridge to Curb Smuggling," *KoSSev*, 9 November, 2023, <https://kossev.info/kosovo-online-najnovije-vesti-kosovo-police-erects-concrete-barriers-on-brnjak-bridge-to-curb-smuggling/>

⁴ Kosovo Online, The court in Pristina annulled the Government's decision on the expropriation of land in northern Kosovo, *Kosovo Online*, 10 January 2024, <https://www.kosovo-online.com/en/news/politics/court-pristina-annulled-governments-decision-expropriation-land-northern-kosovo-10-1>

⁵ These actions have triggered harsh criticism of the international actors: US Embassy in Prishtina, "Quint, EU, and OSCE Statement on the Decision Taken by the Government of Kosovo on May 30 Regarding Expropriation of Over 100 Parcels of Land in Serb-Majority Municipalities," 6 June, 2024, <https://xk.usembassy.gov/st-6-6-2024>; United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*, S/2024/741, Security Council of UN, 14 October, 2024, <https://t.co/mpG6ReNPvd>

⁶ Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo Articles 61 and 128.4, http://old.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Kosovo_with_amend.I-XXV_2017.pdf

⁷ Brussels Agreement (2013): European Union. The First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations, Article 9. Brussels, 19 April 2013, <https://normalizacija.rs/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/%D0%97%D0%B0%D1%98%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B0-%D1%81%D1%80%D0%BF%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%85-%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%88%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0-eng.pdf>

⁸ KoSSev, "ZP Locals Complain of the Behavior of Kosovo Special Forces KP – "The Main Goal Is Order and Security," *KoSSev*, 30 Oktobar, 2023, <https://kossev.info/zp-locals-complain-of-the-behavior-of-kosovo-special-forces-kp-the-main-goal-is-order-and-security/>.

⁹ Deutsche Welle, "Sever Kosova: Duge Cevi i Duga Neizvesnost," *DW*, 20 August, 2022, <https://www.dw.com/sr/sever-kosova-duge-cevi-i-duga-neizvesnost/a-62883198>.

to heavily armed police units, even the "regular" KP forces in the North no longer reflected the ethnic composition of the population.¹⁰

The Kosovo government has since used the collective withdrawal of Serbs from institutions, particularly the Kosovo Police, as justification for both past and future actions. After more than two years, the issue of reintegrating Serbs and meeting the principle of "ethnic representation" in the composition of local police structures remains unresolved. Efforts to recruit young cadets from the Serbian community have primarily been insufficient to achieve the necessary balance in ethnic composition due to the small number of candidates and the pressures Serbian officers face from their community.¹¹

Meanwhile, surveys report record-low trust among the local Serbian population in the police in the North, indicating that this issue is one of the primary drivers of tensions on the ground. The document contextualizes the described lack of trust in the Kosovo Police^{12,13}, constitutionally envisioned as a multiethnic and civic institution. It primarily analyzes the widespread ethnization¹⁴ of the Kosovo Police on social media through the public display of ethno-nationalist symbols by its members, depicting Serbs as primary adversaries. Such occurrences contradict norms of professional police conduct and the applicable legal framework in Kosovo, significantly undermining the normalization of relations and destabilizing the very foundations of Kosovo as a multiethnic society.

A review of social media posts over the past three years reveals a significant objectivization of the Kosovo Police as a security apparatus serving "Albanian national ideas," particularly in the context of the prolonged conflict between the Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo and the broader region. This objectivization is evident in thousands of visual and audiovisual posts on social media, primarily on the TikTok platform, where members of the Kosovo Police are the main subjects. These posts collectively garner views in the hundreds of millions, clearly portraying the police force as ethno-nationalist—both through the symbolism displayed by KP members (such as controversial signs or insignia) and the Albanian nationalist music accompanying the content.

¹⁰ Balkan Insight, "Serbs Stage Mass Resignation from Kosovo State Institutions," *Balkan Insight*, 5 November, 2022, <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/05/serbs-stage-mass-resignation-from-kosovo-state-institutions/>.

¹¹ KoSsev, A car belonging to an officer with the border police was set on fire in N. Mitrovica, *KoSsev*, 3 April 2024, <https://kossev.info/en/car-police-set-on-fire-mitrovica/>

¹² According to a public opinion poll conducted by NGO Aktiv between June and August 2023, on a scale from 1 to 5, respondents from north Kosovo marked the work of the Kosovo Police with **1,36**. NGO Aktiv. *Trend Analysis: Attitudes of Serb Community in Kosovo 2023*, <https://ngoaktiv.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Analiza-trendova-2023-eng-1.pdf>

¹³ In a survey conducted by UBO Consulting for the New Social Initiative between February 29 and March 7, 2024, targeting citizens over the age of 18 from North and South Mitrovica, only 1% of Serbian respondents supported the increased presence of the Kosovo Police and the construction of police bases in the North. Additionally, 0% of Serbian respondents believed that the increased police presence in the North enhances their sense of security, while 35% stated that the heightened police presence actually decreases their perception of safety. New Social Initiative, *In the Eye of the Storm: Perspectives on Crisis in North Kosovo*, <https://newsocialinitiative.org/in-the-eye-of-the-storm/>

¹⁴ Ethnization refers to the process by which social, political, or institutional practices, policies, or relationships are increasingly defined, shaped, or dominated by ethnic identities or considerations.

Furthermore, this behavior violates police procedures and is unconstitutional. Based on the descriptions of such content, the lyrics of the accompanying music, and the sentiments these posts evoke among viewers, it is clear that the underlying intention is to establish dominance over the territory and its population.

Despite the evident nature of this content and its widespread, formulaic ethno-nationalist tendencies, which are easily recognizable to any average internet user in Kosovo, relevant Kosovan institutions, such as the Kosovo Police Inspectorate, have failed to address this issue more seriously.

Relevant Legal Framework

Kosovo's legislative framework developed based on the Ahtisaari Plan, or the "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement," was designed with the imperative of creating a genuinely multiethnic society¹⁵—a principle intended to permeate all levels of the institutional system. As Pristina accepted this compromise, Kosovo fully integrated the Ahtisaari Plan into its Constitution.

Through this process, Albanian leaders embraced the vision of Kosovo as a multiethnic¹⁶ and civic society, thereby rejecting the concept of a nation-state for the Albanian population and the principle of ethnic supremacy, even on a symbolic level.¹⁷ To preserve Kosovo's multiethnic character, the Ahtisaari Plan included several "protective mechanisms" for the Serbian community: power-sharing principles, a model of decentralization as a form of local territorial autonomy, and other "special rights." Under the decentralization model, additional territorial-administrative units were established at the municipal level, wherein the Serbian community, through the principle of "ethnic representation," was meant to govern certain aspects of socio-political and institutional life within those boundaries. Particular attention was given to security, recognizing its critical importance for minority communities in post-conflict societies.

In this context, Article 128 of the Constitution, which pertains to the "Kosovo Police," states in paragraph 2 that the police shall be "professional and reflect the ethnic diversity of the population." Paragraph 4 specifically addresses the principle of "ethnic composition," stipulating that "the ethnic composition of the police within a municipality shall reflect the ethnic composition of the population within the respective municipality." In a broader sense, these guarantees are also mentioned in Article 61 of the Constitution, under the chapter "Rights of Communities and Their Members," which states that "Communities and their members shall be entitled to equitable representation in employment in public bodies and

¹⁵ S/2007/168/Add.1. Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council : addendum : Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/595359?ln=en&v=pdf>

¹⁶ Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo Article 3, http://old.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Kosovo_with_amend.I-XXV_2017.pdf

¹⁷ Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo Article 6, http://old.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Kosovo_with_amend.I-XXV_2017.pdf

publicly owned enterprises at all levels, including in particular in the police service in areas inhabited by the respective Community while respecting the rules concerning competence and integrity that govern public administration.."18

Given that the Serbian side did not accept the aforementioned Ahtisaari Plan, a new dialogue format was initiated under the auspices of the European Union to work on normalizing relations and resolving issues related to the institutional consolidation of Kosovo's system in the North, with additional guarantees for the Serbian community. The most significant outcome of this dialogue was the April 2013 agreement on the "First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations," colloquially known as the "Brussels Agreement." Article 9 of the agreement explicitly addresses the integration of police structures in northern Kosovo by establishing a special police region for the four majority-Serb municipalities ("Regional Police Directorate North"). It explicitly states that "the composition of the Kosovo Police in the north will reflect the ethnic composition of the population of the four municipalities."19

Despite these guarantees, through the Constitution and the "Brussels Agreement" ratified by the Kosovo Assembly, these provisions have been violated or not implemented in subsequent periods. For example, in the UN Secretary-General's report from October 2022²⁰, prior to the withdrawal of Serbian officers from the Kosovo Police, it is noted that "the Kosovo police increased its presence in the four northern Kosovo Serb majority municipalities by opening new field police stations and deploying Kosovo Albanian officers from other parts of Kosovo." The mission further states that "police operations were reportedly often conducted without the involvement of Kosovo police officers from the local police stations, creating friction both between the Kosovo police headquarters in Pristina and local police command and with the local population." The report concludes that such actions could negatively impact the integration of police forces in northern Kosovo. Additionally, the same report urges the Kosovo authorities to "to preserve the full integration of northern Kosovo regional and station-level commands into the Kosovo police framework in line with the "First agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations" of 19 April 2013."

Furthermore, focusing on the conduct of Kosovo Police officers, Kosovo's legislative framework adequately defines which behaviors are acceptable and which are not, along with the institutional sanctions they entail. The framework includes the "Law No. 04/L-076 on Police," the "Police Code of Ethics," and the "Administrative Instruction No. 04/19 for Violations, Measures, and Disciplinary Procedures in Kosovo Police." However, the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, the institution responsible for internal oversight of police officers,

¹⁸ Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo Articles 61 and 128.4, http://old.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Kosovo_with_amend.I-XXV_2017.pdf

¹⁹ Brussels Agreement (2013): European Union. The First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations, Article 9. Brussels, 19 April 2013, <https://www.srbija.gov.rs/specijal/en/120394>

²⁰ S/2022/739, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Report of the Secretary-General, 4 October 2022 (paragraphs 34 and 88): https://unmik.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_2022_739-en_0.pdf

rarely utilizes the *ex officio* mechanism to address public behavior by its members that contradicts the foundations of Kosovo's Constitution and relevant legislation.

Contextualization

To explain the issue of the aforementioned behavior patterns among Kosovo Police officers, the concept of "policing in divided societies" provides a helpful framework. John D. Brewer, a scholar who extensively explored this subject, identifies 12 key characteristics that define policing in such contexts. Some of these characteristics, as this paper demonstrates, are evident in the case under review: 1) "selective enforcement of the law in favor of the dominant group, reflected in both a relaxed attitude towards illegal activity by the dominant group, especially when directed against subordinate communities..."; 2) "an absence of effective mechanisms of public accountability - it is rarely the case in divided societies that the police are impervious to external control, but the state tends to rely on its internal mechanisms of accountability, or the law courts for those few instances where legal action results"/ "however, the state is occasionally pressured into responding to criticisms of the police by instituting mechanisms of public accountability, although they are often biased in its favor." In our context, this role typically falls to the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo; 3) "the polarization of attitudes towards the police and their conduct. Subordinate groups view the police as agents of oppression or occupation and show a minimal commitment to them, while the dominant group tends to look on the police as its own and the guarantor of its position."²¹

In this context, the display of symbols such as the "Punisher" skull in Albanian flag colors or the two-headed eagle can be interpreted as ethno-nationalist gestures signaling dominance over certain territories. These symbols, used by Kosovo Police members, serve as reminders of ethnic hierarchies and power structures that aim to extend throughout Kosovo. Based on conflict theory, symbols and gestures associated with the authority of an ethnic group become instruments of domination when used in contested spaces. In northern Kosovo, where the Pristina government has never fully enjoyed legitimacy, the display of controversial ethno-nationalist symbols by members of the security apparatus is perceived as an explicit attempt to assert control over the territory and convey that the region primarily belongs to the ethnic Albanian majority rather than to the local Serbian population.

Using Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung's typology of violence—direct, structural/institutional, and cultural violence—the manifestation of these symbols by Kosovo Police officers includes elements of the latter two forms. By "cultural violence," Galtung refers to "those aspects of culture, the symbolic spheres of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence."²² In this case, it includes policies that suppress Serbian identity through the removal of flags or Cyrillic signage and the use of ethno-nationalist symbols to promote the dominance of the

²¹ John D. Brewer, "Policing in Divided Societies: Theorising a Type of Policing," *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy* 1, no. 3 (1991): 179-191, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.1991.9964614>

²² Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (August 1990): 291-305.

majority ethnic group. Such symbols normalize the idea of majority domination as socially desirable behavior, paving the way for institutionalized structural violence, which Galtung ultimately defines as institutionalized “social injustice” which, in the observed case, is rooted in ethnic nationalism, or establishment of a system that discriminates citizens based on their ethnic background. This, in turn, often provides a foundation for the appearance of direct violence, which is also present in this context but not the primary focus of this analysis.²³

Moreover, Kosovo Police officers' actions, seen as representations of the ruling oppressive apparatus, evoke fear, anger, and alienation within the minority community. They portray the police not as enforcers of law and order but as participants in a broader political project of territorial and ethnic domination. These gestures further erode trust among the Serbian community, which perceives the police as agents of the majority group's political ambitions rather than protectors of all citizens.

The signaling of allegiance to one ethnic group by police officers exacerbates the "us versus them" dynamic, bringing it down to “good” versus “evil.” Thus, ethnic divisions and hostility deepen while at the same time legitimizing the establishment of specific power relations between majority and non-majority communities. This undermines efforts toward reconciliation and coexistence, as it creates a perception of exclusion that erodes the trust of the non-majority community in the institutions and complicates interethnic cooperation.

Furthermore, the aforementioned lack of robust accountability mechanisms in post-conflict societies, as evident in this case, often allows provocative gestures to go unpunished. The display of controversial or provocative symbols not only undermines the legitimacy of the police but also suggests that institutions implicitly condone such actions. This, in turn, exacerbates ethnic tensions and deepens divisions within the community.

For example, although such behavior is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution²⁴, which in Article 3 – “Equality Before the Law” – emphasizes that “Kosovo is a multiethnic society” (paragraph 1) and that the “exercise of public authority... shall be based upon the principle of equality of all individuals before the law” (paragraph 2), and in Article 6 – “Symbols” – states that “the state symbols of the Republic of Kosovo... reflect its multiethnic character,” it has not been sanctioned. Additionally, the Kosovo Criminal Code²⁵ (Article 141, "Inciting Discord and Intolerance") and Administrative Instruction No. 04/2019 on Violations, Measures, and Disciplinary Procedures in the Kosovo Police²⁶ The frameworks explicitly prohibit such conduct. Yet, the behavior of Kosovo Police members documented in this paper has never been penalized under these frameworks. Moreover, the visual and

²³ Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–191.

²⁴ Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo Articles 3 and 6, http://old.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Kosovo_with_amend.I-XXV_2017.pdf

²⁵ Republic of Kosovo, *Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo*, no. 06/L-074, *Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo*, no. 2, 14 January 2019, Article 141, <https://md.rks-gov.net/desk/inc/media/A5713395-507E-4538-BED6-2FA2510F3FCD.pdf>

²⁶ Kosovo Police, *Administrative Instruction No. 04/2019 on Violations, Measures, and Disciplinary Procedures in the Kosovo Police*: <https://www.kosovopolice.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ADMINISTRATIVE-INSTRUCTION-No.-04-2019.pdf>.

audiovisual content presented in this analysis is clear evidence of widespread violations of at least 13 provisions of the aforementioned Administrative Instruction No. 04/2019 on Violations, Measures, and Disciplinary Procedures in the Kosovo Police.

Article 20 of the AI mentioned above emphasizes that an employee of KP is guilty of “serious discrediting behavior” if they:²⁷

“1.6. Acts inappropriately, influenced by personal feelings, prejudices, hatreds, or social affiliations that affect fair decision-making;”

“1.14. behaves suchg a way ruining the image of Kosovo Police while performing duty or on duty;” (*sic!*)

“1.15. Places unauthorized items or equipment on Police property that represents or may represent offensive or discriminatory, but not limited to;” (*sic!*)

“1.18. Uses without authorization the name, title or photograph of the Police, whether on or off duty;”

“1.19. Is not objective or biased in police affairs, causing consequences for the treatment of citizens and/or police officers;” (*sic!*)

“1.29. Uses, holds, wears police equipment, symbols, parts of clothing or footwear unauthorised by the Service and in violation of the standards of dressing, uniform and police equipment in the respective work unit in violation of applicable law and instructions;”

Article 21 of the same document states that an employee of KP is guilty of “serious disobedience” if they:

“1.19. As a supervisor tolerates unprofessional, unethical, or misconduct by subordinates or staff under supervision;”

“1.21 During the work carries, wears, places signs or symbols that represent religious, racial, sexual, political, ethnic, group elements, etc.;

“1.23. Without authorization, changes the logo, emblems, puts other symbols on workplaces and police equipment;”

“1.24. Inappropriate wear and appearance at work, contrary to the type of dress and appearance authorized and the carrying of unapproved items or accessories;” (*sic!*)

Article 24 states that a KP employee is guilty of a “serious breach of authorization” if they:

“1.16. Appears, represents on social networks with police uniform and police equipment in violation of police ethics and rules of procedure;”

²⁷ The articles are quoted in original, including grammatical mistakes.

“1.17. Publishes, displays, distributes or comments on posts, photos, videos, recordings that damage the image of the Police;”

Article 30 stipulates that a “Kosovo Police officer is guilty of discrimination if In or out of the official duty, violates the rights of others on the basis of nationality or affiliation with any community, social or national origin, race, ethnicity, color, birth, origin, sex, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, language, citizenship, religious belief and belief, political affiliation, political opinion social or personal status, age, family or marital status, pregnancy, health status, disability, genetic inheritance or any other basis.” (*sic!*)

Finally, selective enforcement of the law in favor of the dominant group becomes evident when considering the number of cases in which members of the Serbian community²⁸ have been detained and punished²⁹ for similar ethno-nationalist expressions, such as insignias or clothing. In contrast, the police not only fail to apply the same measures to members of the Albanian community but actively promote the public display of such symbols themselves.

Analysis of the social media

According to available data, internet penetration in Kosovo is 96.6%, placing Kosovo among the top in Europe for users *per capita*. According to certain agencies, by early 2024, approximately 855,000 social media users were recorded. While platforms such as *Facebook* and *Instagram* are the most popular, with over 800,000 and 600,000 users, respectively, this analysis focuses primarily on *TikTok*, estimated to be used by hundreds of thousands of people in Kosovo.³⁰ This platform allowed us to review relevant content and estimate its volume easily. *TikTok* promotes the use of hashtags as a central user tool for discovering content and gaining visibility, as the platform operates entirely on a recommendation-based

²⁸ Sinjali, „Polici i Kosovës shpërndan në Facebook thirrje nacionaliste “Kosova është Serbi”, IPK nis hetimet“, *Sinjali*, 29 November 2021, <https://sinjali.com/polici-i-kosoves-shperndan-ne-facebook-thirrje-nacionaliste-kosova-eshte-serbi-ipk-nis-hetimet/>

²⁹ KoSsev, „Mladić uhapšen na Gazimestanu osuđen na osam meseci zatvora, odbrana će uložiti žalbu“, 6 September 2022, <https://kossev.info/mladic-uhapsen-na-gazimestanu-osudjen-na-osam-meseci-zatvora/>

³⁰ Kosovo 2.0, "Social Media Under the Lens of Fact-Checkers," *Kosovo 2.0*, 17 October 2023, <https://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/social-media-under-the-lens-of-fact-checkers/>.

algorithm. This setup enabled us to use *Exolyt*³¹, a specialized tool for *TikTok* content analysis, to obtain specific data by searching for hashtags associated with the Kosovo Police.




Illustration 1 Date of search: 3 November 2024

As highlighted in the accompanying graph, the number of media posts filtered by hashtags related to the Kosovo Police totals 14,200, generating over 860 million views. However, it should be noted, and we emphasize this as a caveat, that posts often use two or three hashtags from this list (e.g., #njesiaspecialekosoves #kosovopolice), and the *Exolyt* tool aggregates them cumulatively as separate posts. Additionally, it was observed that many posts related to the Kosovo Police do not use hashtags or different ones (e.g., #kosovo #police). Given that broad terms such as #kosovo and #police could not be entered into *Exolyt* due to their lack of specificity and the fact that many posts about the Kosovo Police lack hashtags entirely, there is no doubt that a significant number of *TikTok* posts remained outside the scope of this research.

The popularity of police-related content in Kosovo is further demonstrated by another *TikTok* analytical tool³², which we used to search for the most popular hashtags associated with Kosovo. Among the top 10 hashtags connected to Kosovo, the only specific theme to appear on the list was #police. This trend is not observed in other countries in the region, where the most popular hashtags are typically broader in scope. For example, according to

³¹ Exolyt, "Exolyt: TikTok Analytics & Insights", <https://exolyt.com/>.

³² TikTokHashtags.com, "TikTok Hashtags", <https://tiktokhashtags.com/>

TikTokHashtags.com, the recommended top *TikTok* hashtags associated with Kosovo are: #kosovo, #fyp, #foryou, #albania, #viral, #shqip, #goviral, #kosova, #police, and #albanian.³³

Additionally, while this document includes over 140 screenshots/photographs found through a random search, showcasing widespread patterns of unprofessional behavior by members of the Kosovo Police—illustrating the ethnization of the institution through controversial gestures and other disputed symbols such as flags and emblems—it is essential to emphasize that this ethnization becomes even more apparent when exploring I content directly. The vast majority of these posts, numbering in the thousands, feature visual content of heavily armed police units accompanied by Albanian nationalist music. The lyrics of this music often call for the unification of Albanians, clearly portraying Serbs as the primary adversaries of the "Albanian national struggle," with frequent use of hate speech against them. Some of the most popular artists whose music is used in this context include *Ilir Shaqiri* and *Gold AG*.

Some of the most commonly used songs accompanying the aforementioned visual content, along with links to their lyrics, include³⁴:

Gold AG - Nuk vdes https://teksteshqip.com/gold-ag/teksti/1880025	Ilir Shaqiri - Lulja E Koshares https://teksteshqip.com/ilir-shaqiri/teksti/1869766	Gold Ag - Luftojm per fitore https://teksteshqip.com/gold-ag/teksti/1872706	Ilir Shaqiri - Çlirimitari https://teksteshqip.com/ilir-shaqiri/teksti/1858165
Ilir Shaqiri - Në Mes Të Atdheut https://teksteshqip.com/ilir-shaqiri/teksti/1858282	Meda - Adem Jashari https://teksteshqip.com/meda/teksti/1842418	Gold AG & Hysni Klinaku - Pushka E Lirisë https://teksteshqip.com/gold-ag/teksti/1928447	Arif Vladi - Marshi I UÇK-së https://teksteshqip.com/arif-vlladi/teksti/1856119
Ilir Shaqiri - Nderi I Dardanisë https://teksteshqip.com/ilir-shaqiri/teksti/1858276	Gold AG & Ismet Bexheti - Komandant https://teksteshqip.com/gold-ag/teksti/1889089	Ilir Shaqiri - Tahir Meha https://teksteshqip.com/ilir-shaqiri/teksti/1856216	Gold AG - Diss Serbia https://teksteshqip.com/gold-ag/teksti/1870165

³³ Ibid, date of search: 11 November 2024.

³⁴ A search for these songs and artists also reveals thousands of posts using this music as background audio, many of which specifically feature content about the Kosovo Police or Kosovo Security Forces.

The use of these songs on social media, combined with content featuring members of the Kosovo Police (in the North), conveys a strong nationalist and militaristic message. Many of the songs are associated with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the struggle for Albanian independence, incorporating themes of resistance, sacrifice, and victory.

Selected verse in original	Translation to English	Leitmotif and messages
"Le t'valoj kuq e zi prej Shkupi dej n'Vlorë"	<i>Let the red and black flag wave from Skopje to Vlora</i>	Advocates for the expansion of Albania's borders into North Macedonia
"Ej Shqipni etnike prap du me t'pas n'dorë"	<i>Oh, ethnic Albania, I want to have you in my hands again</i>	Direct call for the creation of "ethnic Albania."
"Vdes e nuk e lshoj gjallë Tuzin e Ulqinin E besen ta jap n'Çameri kthehem prapë"	<i>I'll die before I let go of Tuzi and Ulcinj And I swear I will return to Çameria.</i>	Suggests willingness to die for territorial claims in Montenegro and Greece.
"Ma mire i dekt se i gjall pa ty moj Mitrovicë"	<i>Better dead than alive without you, Mitrovica</i>	Implies a life-or-death claim over Mitrovica
"Qoj t'fala n'Himar juve villazen Shqiptarë -Se s'ka bir greku qe at ven mun me marrë"	<i>Send my regards to Himara, you Albanian brothers, Because no son of a Greek can take that land.</i>	Himarë (Himara) is a coastal region in southern Albania, historically inhabited by both Albanians and Greeks. The statement expresses a strong sense of defiance, emphasizing that Himara is Albanian land and will not be taken by Greece.
"Preshev dej n'Qamëri ska me pas mo kufi"	<i>From Preševo to Çamëria, there will be no more borders</i>	Advocates for the dissolution of international borders to create a unified "Greater Albania."
"Na desim per lugin e shkojm dej te i mrami"	<i>We die for the valley and will fight to the end.</i>	Glorifies martyrdom and perpetuates violence for territorial claims (Presevo valley – part of Serbia)
"Zoti e ka fal ket tok per shqiptar"	<i>God has given this land to the Albanians.</i>	Frames territorial ownership in religious and ethnic terms, fueling exclusivist nationalism
"I msum me vra shkije e me pre sulltan"	<i>I'm used to killing Serbs and slaughtering sultans</i>	Explicit incitement to violence against Serbs and Turks, using dehumanizing slur language (shkije)
"Un ta kalli Qagllavicen mos ma nguc mo Mitrovicen"	<i>I will burn Čaglavica, don't touch Mitrovica.</i>	Threatens destruction of a specific Serbian-populated area, reinforcing hostility


"Pushken e kom ndor m'priti SHQIPNI ETNIKE"	<i>I have the gun in hand; wait for me, Ethnic Albania</i>	Promotes armed struggle to establish "Ethnic Albania."
"Plumbat drejt n'shkije e lypbes te ALLAHU"	<i>Bullets aimed at Serbs seeking faith in Allah</i>	Combines religious invocation with explicit violence toward Serbs using slur language (shkije)
"Në shtrëngat e në stuhi, n'mes Atdheut s'durojm kufi"	<i>In storms and tempests, we do not tolerate borders within the homeland</i>	A clear rejection of internationally recognized borders, promoting irredentism and the idea of a unified "Greater Albania."
"Bashk me Agronin Bahrin e Ilirin Shqipnis e Kosoves ja thejm kufirin"	<i>We will break the border between Albania and Kosovo with Agron, Bahri, and Ilir.</i>	This verse promotes irredentism, advocating for the elimination of borders between Kosovo and Albania.
"Per Shqipni Etnike Atdheu na rriti"	<i>For Ethnic Albania, The homeland raised us.</i>	Explicitly refers to the concept of "Shqipëri Etnike" (Greater Albania), an irredentist idea advocating for the unification of all Albanian-inhabited lands.
"Sa mir flamuri valon nktotrev Bashk jon me mu Shkupi e Presheva Tfala Tirana qon per Prishtinen Kem me bo bashk Malsin e Janinen"	<i>How beautifully the flag waves over these lands, Skopje and Presevo are united with me. Greetings from Tirana to Prishtina, We will unite Malësia and Ioannina.</i>	"Flamuri valon" refers to the Albanian flag waving proudly, symbolizing national pride and unity. "Shkupi" (Skopje) and "Presheva" (Presevo) are areas with significant Albanian populations—Skopje in North Macedonia and Presevo in southern Serbia. "Tfala Tirana qon per Prishtinen" expresses solidarity between Tirana (capital of Albania) and Prishtina (capital of Kosovo). "Kem me bo bashk Malësin e Janinen" speaks of uniting Malësia (the mountainous region inhabited by Albanians) and Janina (Ioannina), a city in northwestern Greece with historical ties to Albanian culture.

<p>"kallëzoju Çetnikëve këtë punë mos e dishin, / se pushka e Lleshit e djeg edhe Nishin"</p>	<p><i>Tell the Chetniks not to interfere in this matter, Because Llesh's rifle can burn even Niš.</i></p>	<p>The term "Çetnik" refers to Serbian nationalist forces, and here, it is used as a derogatory term to incite hatred and further ethnic division, suggesting violence against Serb territories.</p>
<p>"Vi pi presheves pi mesit t'lugines / fol qka po don oshka i biri shkines"</p>	<p><i>I come from the heart of the valley / Say what you want, you son of a Serb.</i></p>	<p>The opening lines are very hostile, addressing someone as the "son of a Serb." This promotes a divisive and ethnically charged narrative using slur words for Serbs (shkines)</p>
<p>"qdo sen teper nuk duroj mashaum per secilin çetnik hazer ka 1 plum"</p>	<p><i>I can't take it anymore; for every Chetnik, there's a bullet</i></p>	<p>This line explicitly calls for violence against ethnic Serbs (referenced as "Chetniks"), openly promoting the idea of killing anyone associated with that ethnicity, using the phrase "one bullet for each Chetnik." This directly contributes to the demonization of an entire group based on their ethnicity.</p>

Combining them with visual material featuring members of the Kosovo Police, such music spreads the idea of ethnic dominance over the region, framing the police's presence as part of the ongoing national struggle of Albanians for territory. Additionally, this could suggest that the content promotes the primacy of Albanian identity in the North, which is predominantly a Serbian area. Given the history of conflict between Serbs and Albanians, such content emotionally resonates with the latter. At the same time, Serbs perceive it as aggressive or provocative, making the Kosovo Police appear as an invasive force meant to subjugate Serbs and ultimately drive them out of the territory. The trend of portraying the police as an instrument for achieving Albanian nationalist goals contributes to the further erosion of Kosovo's multiethnic character, as it fosters an ethnonationalist zeal among the majority community while simultaneously antagonizing Kosovo Serbs, creating feelings of fear and insecurity among them.

When talking about accounts that post such content, it is mainly shared from accounts dedicated primarily to the police/security structures, of which there are dozens, but also from media outlets and police officers' personal profiles. Some of these accounts have tens of thousands of followers and generate millions of likes, and clear manifestations of nationalist sentiments characterize them in the comments of their posts, as well as hate speech toward Serbs.

Some of the accounts that focus almost exclusively on sharing content related to the Kosovo Police (KP) and Kosovo Security Forces (KSF):



In addition to these images, where the police are characterized as an "Albanian institution," there are also posts by police officers themselves, sharing pictures of them in uniform. Through the nationalist music accompanying these posts, they identify themselves as primarily Albanian rather than Kosovo police officers.³⁵ In 2023, *TikTok* also saw videos made and published by police officers, which further contributed to escalating the crisis. For example, there are recordings from May 26, where members of the Kosovo Police filmed themselves desecrating Serbian symbols in occupied municipal buildings,³⁶ or a video showing a detained Serb being tortured in a police station.³⁷ It is also important to note that this policy of dominance is manifested in numerous instances where police officers deployed in Serbian areas refuse to speak Serbian, an official language in Kosovo. They demand that citizens speak to them in Albanian, thereby establishing a power dynamic—demanding that citizens relinquish their constitutional rights and adapt to the institutions instead of the reverse. Such examples have been recorded in videos, showing that the police are capable of communicating in Serbian but refuse to do so, thus violating constitutionally guaranteed

³⁵ <https://bit.ly/3YR9P74>

³⁶ <https://bit.ly/3Z0n722>

³⁷ <https://bit.ly/302p2wL>

rights and signaling that citizens of Serbian nationality must submit to the dominant ethnic group.³⁸³⁹⁴⁰

Additionally, it is essential to highlight that there are accounts on other social media platforms dedicated to promoting the KP, including inappropriate behavior by its members, such as a Facebook page with more than 150,000 followers.⁴¹ However, Albanian-language media are often inclined to share similar content on their social media accounts. They see nothing problematic in such portrayals of the police and promote them as an acceptable model of behavior.

Finally, although it is not the focus of this document, it is worth mentioning that the same phenomenon is present within the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF), which is openly characterized as primarily an Albanian army during official events. In this regard, it is not uncommon to see KSF members singing songs dedicated to Adem Jashari,⁴²⁴³ The former KLA commander, and even to Greater Albania, or the aspirations for the unification of "Albanian" territories in the Balkans.⁴⁴ The most recent such event was the "Steel Wolf" military exercise held on November 11, 2024, attended by Kosovo's highest officials. During the exercise, a large group of soldiers was seen singing of Adem Jashari and Albania, with flags of Albania and the KLA present. The footage was shared on the "IndeksOnline" Facebook page, a mainstream Albanian media outlet with more than 500,000 followers.⁴⁵

Conclusion

The display of provocative symbols by members of the Kosovo Police (KP) in the North serves as a clear message of ethnic and territorial dominance, further reinforcing existing divisions and escalating tensions. In divided societies, symbols with political and ethnic backgrounds are perceived as a threat to the identity and security of the minority group, undermining efforts for reconciliation and peacebuilding.

However, we must not overlook the role of the ruling structures in this process. The statements and behavior of the highest Kosovo officials set the model for social and institutional conduct. In this regard, when the Prime Minister of Kosovo is photographed with a map of Greater Albania⁴⁶, when he refers to the Kosovo Police as the successor of the KLA,⁴⁷

³⁸ <https://bit.ly/3YXz0e5>

³⁹ <https://bit.ly/4fKkvv4>

⁴⁰ <https://bit.ly/3Czc07t>

⁴¹ <https://www.facebook.com/njesiaaspeciale/>

⁴² <https://bit.ly/4fz5lJ2>

⁴³ <https://bit.ly/3YIL9gS>

⁴⁴ <https://bit.ly/3AKC5jq>

⁴⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/share/v/CmgvYcvHCki86mn/>

<https://www.facebook.com/share/v/j9Bx73jCuWx5gEZp/>

<https://www.facebook.com/share/v/3PaMOYKgMYcGSxPs/>

⁴⁶ Greek City Times, "Kosovo's Separatist Leaders and Their Map," *Greek City Times*, 15 December 2022 <https://greekcitytimes.com/2022/12/15/kosovos-separatist-leaders-map/>.

⁴⁷ N1, "Kosovo's Kurti: Kosovo Police a Continuation of KLA," *N1*, 6 April 2023, <https://n1info.rs/english/news/kosovo-s-kurti-kosovo-police-continuation-of-kla/>.

or when he says that Kosovo is Albania,⁴⁸ such messages further affirm the characterization of institutions at all levels, including within the Kosovo Police. At the same time, this practice discourages members of minority, non-Albanian communities from joining Kosovo's security forces.

It is important to mention that the practice of posting such content on social media and the characterization of the Kosovo Police has expanded whenever there has been a specific crisis in the North, which involved special units of the Kosovo Police. Since special forces were not frequently present in the North before, the increased presence of such content and characterization of the Kosovo Police began in September 2021, with the onset of the license plate crisis, and extended throughout 2022 and 2023, especially after the armed attack in Banjska in September 2023.

Additionally, through our fieldwork and communication with citizens, we have observed that a large number of incidents involving the police never become public due to fear of retaliation from the institutions. The main cause of this distrust is the inadequate addressing of this issue, both by Kosovo institutions and by international actors focused on reconciliation, the rule of law, and the building of a multiethnic society in Kosovo.

Therefore, if we aim for any long-term, sustainable solution in the context of normalizing relations to preserve the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo, the security issue of the Serbian community must be at the center of this process or integrated into solutions within the framework of self-governance for the Serbian community. This solution should be based on the Constitution of Kosovo and the "Brussels Agreement" and, accordingly, ensure the respect of the "ethnic key" principle in police composition, not only within regional and local structures but also in the context of the special units of the Kosovo Police—in order to prevent the abuse of the police for political gain by Albanian parties in power. Additionally, mechanisms should be established to strengthen trust in the institution of the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, drawing inspiration from the judicial system and the panel of the Appeals Court, and it should be required that reports of police overreach be assigned to officers in accordance with the "ethnic key" principle—whereby Albanian inspectors and prosecutors handle cases involving Albanians, and Serbian inspectors and prosecutors handle cases involving Serb complainants.

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2. Brussels Agreement (2013): European Union. First Agreement Governing Normalization of Relations, Brussels, 19 April 2013. [https://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/First Agreement of Principles of Normalisation of Relations April 19 2013.pdf](https://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/First%20Agreement%20of%20Principles%20of%20Normalisation%20of%20Relations%20April%2019%202013.pdf).


⁴⁸ Alternativna, „Izjava nedelje," *Alternativna*, 18 November 2024.: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=8557283861067048>

3. Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo: <https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDocumentDetail.aspx?ActID=3702>
4. Galtung, Johan. "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (August 1990): 291–305.
5. Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–191.
6. Criminal Code no. 04/L-082, *Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo*, 2013.
7. Kosovo Police, Administrative Instruction no. 04/2019.



Addendum

Addendum

Randomly found photographs/screenshots featuring members of the Kosovo Police posing with Albanian symbols, such as hand gestures depicting the double-headed eagle, flags, and emblems on uniforms. The compilation also includes other inappropriate content that police officers have shared on social media, which is defined under police legislation as "serious insubordination," "seriously discrediting behavior," and "serious breach of authority." Most of this content was created after September 2021. Some of the images and sections below will include additional descriptions.






Commander of the Special Operations Units of the Kosovo Police, Besart Ahmeti, who was awarded a security commendation by the President of Kosovo in February 2023, is seen wearing a "Punisher" emblem in the colors of the Albanian flag. Additionally, a screenshot shared on social media shows a comment directed at Ahmeti, stating, "Keep the Shkije (a derogatory term for Serbs) down," which received gratitude and approval from Ahmeti.



Members of the Special Units of the Kosovo Police are seen making hand gestures depicting the symbol of the Albanian eagle.



Members of the Kosovo Police seen wearing emblems of Albania.




Members of the Kosovo Police seen wearing emblems of Albania and US.


A dedicated section features photographs of police officers wearing emblems inspired by the Marvel Comics anti-hero Frank Castle, known as the Punisher, designed in the colors of the Albanian flag. The Punisher is a character who seeks extrajudicial justice following the murder of his family, often employing violence and acting outside the law. As such, the use of the Punisher symbol by law enforcement has long been a source of controversy globally. Even Marvel Comics has distanced itself from the use of this logo by law enforcement agencies.

(Read more about this issue at the following link: <https://gizmodo.com/as-the-punisher-skull-re-emerges-on-cops-in-u-s-protes-1843911179>)






Members of the Kosovo Police are seen wearing Punisher emblems in northern Kosovo. The photographs above were taken in the center of North Mitrovica, the first one is from December 2024 taken at Car Lazar Square. One of the actions featured in the photos above was overseen by EULEX as evident from the screenshot of the video.



Members of the Kosovo Police are seen wearing Punisher emblems in northern Kosovo. The first photo in the second column is from December 2024 in Zvečan.




Members of the Kosovo Police are seen wearing Punisher emblems in northern Kosovo.








Kosovo.Forces





On the first photo a member of the Kosovo Police was seen wearing a Punisher emblem and an Albanian flag. This is a screenshot from a video broadcast by the Media Center Čaglavica in Gračanica on November 28, 2024.









Below are several photos/screenshots related to events following May 26, 2023, involving the takeover of municipal buildings in northern Kosovo.

The images on this page feature a certain police officer with the *TikTok* username "Bess.nj.s.i." On May 26, this officer posted a video from inside the municipal building in Zvečan, showing himself spitting on and stepping on the Serbian coat of arms thrown in a garbage bag. Three days later, on May 29, he posted another video standing in a police cordon at the entrance of the Zvečan municipal building, positioned behind a line of KFOR personnel, prior to the violence that unfolded later that day.

This *TikTok* account was later deleted. Video footage is now available at the following link:

https://x.com/Aco_Sfens/status/1674855088588742657?t=Td0MIO38AYRvwK3D5g9eFw&s=19






Another video depicting the desecration of Serbian symbols was posted on TikTok at the end of May 2023, which was later deleted from the platform.

A photograph taken in front of the municipal building in Zubin Potok.



SA screenshot from a video recorded at the Bistrica checkpoint in the municipality of Zvečan, posted at the end of May by the Albanian media outlet ReportTV.





A screenshot of Ivan Orlović wearing a bag on his head, while detained in a police station. He who was arrested in connection with the violence that occurred on May 29 in front of the Zvečan municipality.



A photograph of police officers from the municipality of Leposavić with the newly appointed mayor, Lulzim Hetemi.

In addition to the emblems, police officers often take photos with the Albanian flag, symbols of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), and other identity symbols, clearly displaying their ethnic affiliation, which contradicts the internal regulations of the Kosovo Police. Furthermore, in many of the images found, the faces of the police officers are blurred to conceal their identities.





The photos from northern Kosovo, including those from the center of North Mitrovica. Most were made in December 2024.



A photo of a police officer from North Mitrovica, as well as next to maps of Greater Albania.






Photos of police officers from northern Kosovo in September 2021.



Photos of police officers from northern Kosovo from November and December 2022.



Photo of a police officers from northern Kosovo.





A sizeable patrol of Kosovo Police officers in North Mitrovica in December 2024.




Training Center of the Kosovo Police.






Photos of police officers in northern Kosovo, including North Mitrovica. In the bottom footage, a police officer records the interior of a vehicle and the symbol of the KLA, followed by the exterior, showing that he is passing through the village of Sočanica in the municipality of Leposavić, using the hashtag #albania. The video and the first photograph are from December 2024.



A photo of police officers from northern Kosovo in December 2022.





Members of the Kosovo Police Special Units.





A photo of a police officer from September 2024, in the municipality of Zubin Potok, village of Brnjak. In addition to illegal insignia, the officers are seen in a supplementary video going over the KFOR-designated ABL.





A patrol on a quad bike in Zvečan, a screenshot from a video recording.









Photos from north Kosovo.






Police officers with flags and motifs of Greater Albania.










A visit by the controversial Albanian hooligan, Ismail Morina to police officers in northern Kosovo.





Suspendohet polici që shau pasi ia larguan flamujt dhe fotografinë e Adem Jasharit
Policia ka suspenduar një zyrtar policor n...




bardha Azemi · 2023-12-22



Fisi.dfc · Photo · 06-13

#njnsh #kosovopolice #



17



Marked: A member of the Kosovo Police (K.P.) who is undergoing a trial for wounding a Serb, M.J., at the Bistrica checkpoint in April 2023.



This issue has often been raised by social actors among Kosovo Serbs, and some of these photos were shown during the protests against police behavior. The institutional response to these reports was missing, but on the other hand, the police officer whose pictures were shared as an example of problematic behavior did react. For instance, in this case, a politician from the Kosovo Serb community, Aleksandar Arsenijević, showed a photo of police officers making a double-headed eagle gesture on a TV show and in response, the officer, Selman Zogaj, reacted and expressed pride in the photo.

 Mitropol
2 d · 🌐

Police officers from Prizren taking care of order and safety in the city of Mitrovica 🇷🇸 🇦🇸

⚙️ Rate this translation



👍 118

1 Comment · 2 shares

<  Selman Zogaj

Follow




1 / 3



My eyes wide when I rest, my freedom with dreams, damn my blood when they kill without a fight

#kosovopolice


 Baresha - Jurgen Pecnikaj ...




Kosovo Police officer in the center of North Mitrovica.




Personal TikTok account of a Kosovo Police officer.



Posts from personal profiles of police officers, one of which includes the hashtag #KosovoisAlbania.



Members of the Special Unit wearing the Albanian traditional cap “plis,” clearly identifying themselves ethnically while in uniform and on institutional premises.



Police officers with symbols of Agim Ramadanaj Katana, a commander of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army).



Police officers at the Merdare border crossing wear the Albanian traditional cap “plis,” clearly identifying themselves ethnically, which is contrary to the internal procedures of the Kosovo Police.



Kosovo Police recruits hand gesture the double-headed eagle.

In addition to photos, there are sometimes public comments that represent open hate speech against members of the Serbian community.

One such comment is from police officer Hetem Pireva, who approved a public call for the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Serbs.

Hetem Pireva
3,5 хиљ. пријатеља

Додај пријатеља

Пошаљите поруку

Објаве Фотографије

Детаљи

Студирао **Gjimnazi "Zenel Hajdir - Gjilan**

Живи у месту **Kamenica, Kosovo**

Selim Pacolli
5 h · 🌐

Only the concept "STORM" works here!
A classic yard sweep!
Otherwise, this evil will always haunt us!
🌐 Оцените овај превод

Mitropol · Follow
42m · 🌐

Kjo është sasia e madhe e armëve, municionit e uniformave të gjetura sot në veri!

Свиђа ми се Коментар Пошаљи Подели
138

Најрелевантнији ▾

Hetem Pireva
Sakt daj
3 h Свиђа ми се Одговори 1 🌐



Kosovo Sever portal - Kossev
2 h · 🌐

I danas zvizduci u Mitrovici ovaj put na šetalištu sa zvižducima dočekan i ispraćen zamenik ministra administra... Прикажи још

1 још... > 🌐

Tarik Kurgaš
U dupe im treba nabit ovu pistoljku
1 h Свиђа ми се 3 🌐 🤔 🤔
Одговори

Another example is a recorded comment by police officer Tarik Kurgaš, who commented on the protest of Kosovo Serbs against Kosovo government officials, saying: "This whistle should be shoved up their asses."

Nova društvena inicijativa - New Social Initiative (NSI)
Centar za afirmativne društvene akcije - Center for
Affirmative Social Action (CASA)

Institut za teritorijalni ekonomski razvoj - Institute for
Territorial Economic Development (InTER)

NGO AKTIV

Centar za zastupanje demokratske kulture - Advocacy Center
for Democratic Culture (ACDC)