



KOSOVO-SERBIA **A DIFFERENT APPROACH**

April 2024

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The views expressed in this this report do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Embassy of the Netherlands.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This project seeks to thoroughly analyze the viewpoints and sentiments of the Serbian community in Kosovo using quantitative research methods. The main goal is to gather and assess their perspectives on a range of issues that are important to them and relevant to the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo. Through this research, we aim to provide empirical data that can help improve internal dialogues between central institutions and communities in Kosovo. Below, we present the key findings of the report:

Key Findings

Community Challenges and Issues

- The community's top three daily concerns are general security/stability (51%), political freedom (43%), and employment/economic conditions (40%), indicating pressing issues for residents.
- Corruption emerges as the most significant challenge (42%) regarding political freedom and democracy, with concerns about political interventions from both the Kosovo and Serbian governments.
- There are significant variations between urban and rural areas in perceived challenges, such as corruption being more prevalent in rural areas (49%) versus urban areas (31%), while urban areas prioritize the lack of proper political representation compared to rural areas (41% vs. 30%).

The Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue

- Respondents express varied perceptions regarding government efforts towards minority groups, with substantial agreement that dialogue and understanding are widely promoted (61%), but notable concerns exist about barriers to accessing services (68%) and underrepresentation in media (66%).
- The Serbian Orthodox Church emerges as the primary stakeholder for dialogue about the Serbian community's needs (58%), followed by Serbian political parties from both Kosovo and Serbia (46-44%).
- Preferences for dialogue mediators differ between regions, with urban respondents favoring other Kosovo political parties (31%) and rural respondents prioritizing political parties in Serbia (59%).
- Expectations regarding the impact of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue on relations between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs show a slight decrease from Wave 1 to Wave 2, with 53% in Wave 1 expecting improvement compared to 48% in Wave 2. Conversely, the percentage of respondents not expecting changes decreased from 43% in Wave 1 to 39% in Wave 2.

Trust in State Institutions and Superpowers

- Healthcare workers maintain the highest level of trust among respondents, with a score of 2.45 in Wave 1 and 2.25 in Wave 2, indicating consistent confidence in their services.
- Trust in various institutions and countries fluctuates, with Russia remaining the most trusted entity, while entities like KFOR, the EU, and the USA experience significant decreases in trust scores, reflecting shifting perceptions among respondents.

Self-Management Framework

- 64% of respondents report having a basic understanding of the Self-Management Framework, with 22% expressing limited familiarity, while 9% exhibit a deeper level of knowledge by stating they are very familiar, and a minority of 5% stated not being familiar at all.
- Over two waves of the survey, opinions regarding the establishment of the Self-Management Framework have shifted, with Wave 1 showing a significant majority (84%) in favor and only 12% against it, while in Wave 2, although the majority remained in favor (73%), opposition increased to 23%.
- Perceptions of the Self-Management Framework in Kosovo show that a majority (70%) view it positively for Serbian rights and reconciliation, with 58% seeing it fostering interethnic cooperation, while 18% perceive it as undermining Kosovo's sovereignty.

Future in Kosovo

- While in Wave 1, 36% of respondents believed inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo would improve, in Wave 2, this perception decreased to 28%, with a notable increase to 52% foreseeing relations remaining the same.
- Across various cities in Kosovo, Wave 2 shows a trend towards increased non-visitation or decreased visitation compared to Wave 1. Notably, there is a significant rise in non-visitation to Prishtina, Prizren, Gjilan, and Kamenice in Wave 2.
- Shopping remains the primary reason for visiting cities on both waves, followed by business opportunities. However, interest in nightlife seems to decline from 7% in Wave 1 to 3% in Wave 2, indicating changing preferences in visitation reasons.
- Respondents across both waves generally perceive low obstacles to having neighbors or working with members from diverse communities, although obstacles decreased in Wave 2. However, Albanians are consistently seen as presenting a moderate level of obstacle compared to other communities, particularly in workplace settings.

Sentiment towards CBK's decision on currency

- While in Wave 1, 36% of respondents believed inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo would improve, in Wave 2, this perception decreased to 28%, with a notable increase to 52% foreseeing relations remaining the same.
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- Respondents across both waves generally perceive low obstacles to having neighbors or working with members from diverse communities, although obstacles decreased in Wave 2. However, Albanians are consistently seen as presenting a moderate level of obstacle compared to other communities, particularly in workplace settings.
- The perceived likelihood of Euro adoption shows that almost two-thirds of the respondents (64%) believe it is likely, while only 10% find it unlikely, and 26% are unsure. Urban respondents are more optimistic (77%), while rural respondents are more uncertain and skeptical, with 31% unsure and 13% expressing doubt.

INTRODUCTION

To assist the Institute for Social Policy “Musine Kokalari” and New Social Initiative in understanding the attitudes and perspectives of the Serbian community in Kosovo regarding their needs, interests, and service provision, UBO Consulting proposed conducting a structured questionnaire in ten municipalities with a Serbian majority in Kosovo as part of the quantitative methodology. Additionally, to ensure a robust empirical foundation for further proposals aimed at fostering internal dialogue between central institutions and these communities, the questionnaire was administered to a representative sample of 500 citizens. The main findings and conclusions from this survey research study are outlined in the following sections.

The research is a part of the project **Kosovo-Serbia: Different approach** implemented by New Social Initiative, Institute for Social Policy “Musine Kokalari”, Center for Social Inclusion funded by Embassy of the Netherlands in Kosovo.

METHODOLOGY

This section outlines the research methodology employed in the study, encompassing data collection, sampling plan, questionnaire finalization, survey team recruitment and training, fieldwork execution, quality assurance, and data analysis.

The methodology utilized for the data collection followed a quantitative approach, employing personal interviews facilitated by Computer-Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI) technique. The survey was inclusive of participants from the Serbian community residing in Kosovo. To ensure representation across the region, the study encompassed ten (10) municipalities with Serbian majority in the country: Leposaviq/Leposavić, Novobërdë/Novo Brdo, Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok, Shtërpçë/Štrpce, Zvečan/Zvečan, Gračanica/Gračanica, Ranillug/Ranilug, Partesh/Parteš, Kllokot/Klokot, and Mitrovicë e Veriut/Severna Mitrovica. Data collection was conducted through face-to-face interviews during March-April 2024, allowing for direct interaction with participants. Following the interviews, the collected data was processed and managed using specialized survey management software, Kobo Toolbox, ensuring accuracy and efficiency in handling the information. In total, 500 interviews were successfully completed, providing a comprehensive dataset for analysis. The distribution of these interviews across the municipalities is outlined in the subsequent table, offering insights into the geographic representation of the surveyed population

Table 1. Sample distribution.

No.	Municipality	Urban	Rural	Total
1	North Mitrovica	101	25	126
2	Leposavić/Leposaviq	38	57	96
3	Zvečan/Zveçan	15	70	85
4	Zubin Potok	19	55	74
5	Gračanica/ Graçanicë	18	26	44

6	Ranilug/ Ranillug	0	21	21
7	Novo Brdo/ Novobërdë	2	16	18
8	Štrpce/ Shtërpçë	3	14	17
9	Parteš/ Partesh	0	10	10
10	Klokot/ Kllokot	0	10	10
Total		196	304	500

The quantitative survey data was cleaned and analyzed using SPSS. Tables were created according to the finalized analysis plan, developed in collaboration with the report writing team. Data validation techniques were utilized to address any issues such as missing, inaccurate, redundant, or irrelevant information within the dataset.

The study includes trends between two periods, the data from Wave 1 are from the survey conducted in July-August 2023, while the data from Wave 2 are from the survey conducted in March-April 2024. The presented trends offer valuable insights; however, it is crucial to interpret them cautiously given that the sample changed from Wave 1 to Wave 2, decreasing from 800 to 500. These comparisons were included for questions that remained the same through two periods. However, due to modifications such as the removal, addition, or alteration of certain options within the questions, not all comparisons were feasible. Nonetheless, the data still provides valuable insights into shifts over time, though the changes in sample size may impact the robustness of certain conclusions. Careful consideration of these factors is necessary to ensure accurate interpretation of the findings.

Additionally, the research team conducted cross-tabulations to identify patterns, trends, and probabilities within the raw data. It is important to note that cross-tabulations focusing on municipalities in the North and those with a Serbian majority in the Rest of Kosovo may not represent the entire population due to the limited sample size. Consequently, they should not be employed to generalize broadly about the perspectives of Serbian residents in Kosovo. It is worth noting that the North of Kosovo includes the municipalities of Mitrovicë e Veriut/ Severna Mitrovica, Zveçan/Zvečan, Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok, and Leposaviq/Leposavić, with a total sample of 380 respondents. The Rest of Kosovo includes the six remaining municipalities, namely, Graçanica/Gračanica, Ranillug/Ranilug, Shtërpçë/Štrpce, Partesh/Parteš, Novobërdë/Novo Brdo, and Kllokot/Klokot, with a total sample of 120.

Disclaimer: In certain cases, the percentages may exceed 100% due to rounding up values.

STUDY RESULTS

This study delves into the multifaceted challenges and dynamics faced by the Serbian community residing in Kosovo. With a sample size of 500 participants, this research focuses to comprehensively explore various aspects of community life and governance in Kosovo. The first section delves into community challenges and issues, covering a wide range of topics such as employment, security, political and religious freedoms, access to services, infrastructure, and environmental concerns.

The subsequent sections focus on specific themes such as the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, trust in state institutions and international entities, perceptions of interethnic relations, the Self-Management Framework, and sentiments towards recent currency decisions. Each section contains questions designed to solicit opinions, attitudes, and expectations from respondents, providing valuable insights into their views on governance, dialogue processes, institutional trust, interethnic dynamics, and economic policies. Through a combination of multiple-choice and scale-based questions, the research instrument aimed to capture a comprehensive picture of community perspectives and experiences in Kosovo.

Demographics

Before exploring the challenges and perspectives within the Serbian community of Kosovo, it is crucial to grasp the diverse demographics underpinning it. This section offers a summary of the demographic composition of Serbian individuals in settlement.

The study encompassed a total of 500 respondents. Gender-wise, the distribution was 49 percent female, 51 percent male. Geographically, 39 percent were from urban areas, while 61 percent were from rural areas.



Figure 1. Settlement of the respondents

In terms of age distribution, respondent ages were categorized as follows: 9 percent were aged 18-24; 28 percent were 25-34; 29 percent were 35-44; 17 percent were 45-54; 17 percent were 55-64; and two percent were 65 years or older.



Figure 2. Age of the respondents

Marital status indicated that the majority of the respondents (64 percent) were married, 31 percent were single, four percent were divorced, and five percent were widowed. Education levels varied, with 72 percent having completed secondary school, 14 percent holding a university/college or master's degree, and nine percent currently being students.

The respondents' employment status reveals a varied landscape, almost half (49 percent) are employed in the public sector, meanwhile, 21% are engaged in the private sector. Notably, 10 percent are unemployed, highlighting labor market challenges. Additionally, 6 percent are students, 6 percent are self-employed, and 4 percent each are pensioners and housewives, reflecting transitions in career stages and domestic roles.

49%
Work in public sector

21%
Work in private sector

10%
Unemployed

6%
Student

6%
Self employed

4%
Pensioner

4%
Housewife

Figure 3. Employment status of the respondents

The results regarding personal income show a diverse distribution of personal income among respondents. Notably, 18 percent reported no income, while 34 percent earned between 301 to 450 euros and 21 percent between 451 to 600 euros. Additionally, smaller percentages reported higher incomes, with four percent reporting earning more than 751 euros.

Main Findings of the Survey

Community Challenges and Issues

The data presents the main issues faced by the community on a daily basis, ranked by the percentage of respondents who identified each issue. The top three issues are general security/stability (51%), political freedom (43%), and employment/economic conditions (40%). These issues are more prevalent than the others listed, indicating they are the most pressing concerns for the community. Endangered cultural identity (28%) and religious freedom (21%) also show considerable levels of concern among respondents.

A relatively small percentage of respondents (4%) perceive freedom of movement within the country as an issue. Among those who do see it as a concern, the reasons vary. The most common reasons cited are the fear of Albanians (n=7) and security concerns (n=4). Other reasons cited include not feeling safe (n=2), the belief that Serbs are in serious danger (n=1), and the desire for a normal life (n=1).




Figure 4. What are the main issues that your community faces on a daily basis?

The main challenge faced by the community regarding political freedom and democracy is corruption, which emerges as the most significant challenge (42%). Political interventions from both the Kosovo government (36%) and the Serbian government (20%) are the main challenges for communities. Additionally, there are concerns about the lack of proper political parties representing the community (34%) and the lack of electoral integrity (20%), indicating dissatisfaction with the political landscape and electoral process. There are other concerns mentioned but in relatively low percentages.

Among those who perceive coercion through physical violence, intimidation, threats, and economic pressure as an issue, n=3 respondents attribute this coercion to leaders and members of political parties. Another n=3 respondents attribute this coercion to Albanians, and n=1 respondent mentioned the Kosovo Police as being responsible for coercion.

42%

Corruption

36%

Political interventions from Kosovo government

34%

Lack of proper political parties representing the community

20%

Political interventions from Serbian government

20%

Lack of electoral integrity

16%

Lack of political pluralism

13%

Lack of media freedom

11%


Faith in local/ central Kosovo institutions

2%

Coercion through physical violence, intimidation, threats, and economic pressure

Figure 5. What are your community's main challenges regarding political freedom and democracy?

The data highlights significant differences in the perceived challenges regarding political freedom and democracy between urban and rural areas. Corruption is identified as a major challenge in both urban and rural areas, but it is more pronounced in rural areas, with 49 percent of respondents highlighting it compared to 31 percent in urban areas. The lack of proper political parties representing the community is seen as a more significant challenge in urban areas (41%) compared to rural areas (30%). Political interventions from the Kosovo government are viewed as a more significant challenge in rural areas (41%) compared to urban areas (28%). Lack of media freedom is identified as a more significant challenge in rural areas (17%) compared to urban areas (6%).



When comparing the waves, there are several notable changes in the main challenges faced by the community regarding public safety and stability. The most significant change is observed in the perception of insufficient border management and control measures, which decreased by 17 percentage points from 50 percent in Wave 1 to 33 percent in Wave 2. Another significant change is related to the lack of infrastructure maintenance and public spaces, which increased by 14 percentage points from 21 percent in Wave 1 to 35 percent in Wave 2. The other main challenges, including insufficient capacity and effectiveness of local law enforcement and lack of social integration and inclusion among different ethnic communities, remained relatively stable between the two waves, indicating that these issues continue to be significant concerns for the community.




Figure 7. What are the main challenges that your community faces regarding public safety and stability?

Moreover, respondents were queried about their willingness to assist the municipality in enhancing its communication and collaboration with citizens regarding the aforementioned issues. The data indicates a slight decline in the percentage of respondents willing to aid the municipality in improving its communication and collaboration on these issues, from 47 percent in Wave 1 to 37 percent in Wave 2. Conversely, there is a slight increase in the percentage of respondents who might be willing to help the municipality enhance its communication and collaboration concerning these issues (42% in Wave 1, 46% in Wave 2).




Figure 10. Would you be willing to help the municipality improve its communication and collaboration with citizens regarding the aforementioned issues?

The data reveals a level of disagreement among respondents regarding the efforts of the Government of Kosovo toward minority groups. Across all statements, a majority of respondents either strongly disagree or disagree to some extent with the statements. Regarding equal access to employment, healthcare, and education services, 86 percent of respondents either strongly disagree or disagree to some extent that minority groups have equal access. Similarly, there is a high level of disagreement regarding the meaningful representation of minority communities in government institutions (91%). In terms of safety and security, 79 percent of respondents either strongly disagree/disagree to some extent that minority groups feel safe and secure in their communities under government protection without fear of discrimination or harassment. Regarding media representation, 85 percent of respondents either strongly disagree or disagree to some extent that minority voices are represented in media and public discourse. Lastly, regarding equal access to voting rights and political participation, 76% of respondents either strongly disagree or disagree to some extent that the government ensures equal access for minority communities.




Figure 11. To what extent do you agree about the following statements regarding efforts of the Government of Kosovo toward minority groups?

The Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue

When it comes to fostering dialogue and understanding among different ethnic and cultural groups, responses are fairly evenly split, with 61 percent of respondents agreeing to some extent or strongly agreeing that the government actively promotes such dialogue and understanding. Concerning barriers to accessing employment, healthcare, and education services, a notable perception exists among respondents, with 68 percent agreeing to some extent or strongly agreeing that minority groups face these barriers. Similarly, there is a significant perception among respondents regarding the underrepresentation or marginalization of minority voices in media and public discourse, with 66 percent agreeing to some extent or strongly agreeing. On the topic of meaningful representation in government institutions, there is a slightly more positive perception, with 65 percent of respondents agreeing to some extent or strongly agreeing that minority communities lack meaningful representation. Lastly, concerning input from minority communities in political decision-making processes, there is also a relatively positive perception, with 66 percent of respondents agreeing to some extent or strongly agreeing that the government actively seeks such input.




Figure 12. To what extent do you agree about the following statements regarding efforts of the Government of Kosovo toward minority groups?

Overall, these findings highlight the differing perceptions between urban and rural areas regarding the efforts of the Government of Kosovo toward minority groups. Regarding the government's promotion of dialogue and understanding between different ethnic and cultural groups, urban respondents are more likely to agree to some extent/strongly agree (55%) compared to rural respondents (65%). In terms of meaningful representation of minority groups in government institutions, urban respondents are more likely to agree to some extent that such representation exists (11%) compared to rural respondents (6%). Regarding access to employment, healthcare, and education services, rural respondents agree to some extent/strongly agree that minority groups have equal access (73%) compared to urban respondents (60%).

Table 2. To what extent do you agree about the following statements regarding efforts of the Government of Kosovo toward minority groups? (Disaggregated by settlement)

		Strongly disagree	Disagree to some extent	Agree to some extent	Strongly agree
The government ensures equal access to voting rights and opportunities for political participation for minority communities	Urban	37%	15%	36%	12%
	Rural	54%	39%	6%	0%
Minority communities have meaningful representation in government institutions	Urban	30%	58%	11%	2%
	Rural	67%	27%	6%	
Minority groups have equal access to employment and healthcare, and education services	Urban	47%	24%	20%	9%
	Rural	55%	41%	3%	
Minority voices are represented in media and public discourse	Urban	35%	41%	17%	7%
	Rural	60%	33%	7%	1%
Minority groups feel safe and secure in their communities under government protection without fear of discrimination or harassment.	Urban	38%	30%	23%	29%
	Rural	58%	31%	6%	5%

		Strongly disagree	Disagree to some extent	Agree to some extent	Strongly agree
The government does not actively promote dialogue and understanding between different ethnic and cultural groups.	Urban	23%	21%	30%	26%
	Rural	24%	12%	32%	33%
Minority communities lack meaningful representation in government institutions.	Urban	18%	20%	34%	28%
	Rural	15%	18%	36%	31%
Minority groups face barriers to accessing employment and healthcare, and education services	Urban	20%	20%	31%	29%
	Rural	16%	11%	36%	37%
Minority voices are underrepresented or marginalized in media and public discourse	Urban	16%	28%	28%	28%
	Rural	16%	11%	35%	38%
The government does not actively seek input from minority communities in political decision-making processes	Urban	12%	28%	33%	26%
	Rural	15%	15%	32%	38%

The majority of respondents consider the dialogue between the Kosovo government and Serbian citizens in Kosovo to be very important, with 63 percent of respondents expressing this view in both waves. Additionally, 24 percent of respondents in Wave 1 and 19 percent in Wave 2 categorize it as very important.




Figure 13. How important is the dialogue between the Kosovo government and Serbian citizens in Kosovo?

According to whom the Government of Kosovo should dialogue about the needs of the Serbian community in Kosovo, the Serbian Orthodox Church emerges as the most prominent stakeholder (58%), indicating it as a key dialogue partner. Serbian political parties, both from the Government of Serbia and those in Kosovo, are also considered important dialogue partners, with 46 percent and 44 percent of respondents. A relatively lower percentage of respondents (23%) indicate that Serbian citizens themselves should be part of the dialogue. Other stakeholders identified for dialogue include non-Serbian Kosovo political parties (17%), NGOs in Kosovo (7%), NGOs in Serbia (5%), and representatives/delegates from the EU (5%) and the USA (2%).



Figure 14. With whom should the Government of Kosovo dialogue about the needs of the Serbian community in Kosovo?

The data indicates varying preferences among respondents regarding with whom the Government of Kosovo should dialogue about the needs of the Serbian community in Kosovo, with differences between respondents from the Rest and North regions. The Serbian Orthodox Church is seen as the most important stakeholder for dialogue, with 80 percent of respondents in the Rest and 51 percent in the North indicating it. Serbian political parties in Kosovo (32% in the Rest and 48% in the North), as well as Serbian political parties from the Government of Serbia (61% in the Rest and 42% in the North), are also seen as important stakeholders. Other Kosovo political parties, NGOs in Kosovo, and NGOs in Serbia are seen as less important stakeholders, with single-digit percentages of respondents indicating them.




Figure 15. With whom should the Government of Kosovo dialogue about the needs of the Serbian community in Kosovo? (Disaggregated by region)

The data indicates several key topics on which the Government of Kosovo should dialogue with Serbian citizens, according to respondent perceptions. The most prominent topic identified is general security/stability, with 54 percent of respondents indicating it as a key topic for dialogue. Other topics mentioned by respondents were improvement of employment and economic conditions, which are also considered significant (47%), quality of education (30%), and health services (29%). Moreover, cultural heritage preservation and cultural and sports activities are identified as important topics by 19 percent of respondents each.

54%

General security/ stability

47%

Improvement of employment and economic conditions

30%

Quality of educational services

29%

Quality of health services

19%

Cultural heritage preservation

19%

Cultural and sports activities

17%

Integration in the Kosovar society

15%

Political representation and participation

15%

Minority rights protection

11%

Protection of religious freedoms

Figure 16. What are the topics on which the Government of Kosovo should dialogue with Serbian citizens?

The data shows notable differences in the topics on which the government of Kosovo should dialogue with Serbian citizens in urban and rural areas. General security and stability are seen as the most important topics for dialogue in both urban and rural areas, but they are more pronounced in rural areas, with 66 percent of respondents indicating them compared to 37 percent in urban areas. Improvement of employment and economic conditions is also seen as a key topic for dialogue in both urban and rural areas, but it is more pronounced in rural areas (54%) indicating it compared to 36 percent in urban areas. Other important topics for dialogue include the quality of educational services, quality of health services, and cultural and sports activities, although there are differences in the level of importance between urban and rural areas.




Figure 17. What are the topics on which the Government of Kosovo should dialogue with Serbian citizens? (Disaggregated by settlement)

Regarding the topics on which the Government of Kosovo should dialogue with Serbian citizens, the data indicates varying preferences among respondents from the Rest and North regions. General security and stability are seen as the most important topics for dialogue, with 68 percent of respondents in the Rest and 50 percent in the North indicating them. Improvement of employment and economic conditions is also seen as a key topic for dialogue, with 68 percent of respondents in the Rest and 40 percent in the North indicating it. Other important topics for dialogue include the quality of educational services, quality of health services, and cultural and sports activities, although there are differences in the level of importance between the Rest and North regions.




Figure 18. What are the topics on which the Government of Kosovo should dialogue with Serbian citizens? (Disaggregated by region)

Most respondents perceive political parties in Serbia (Government of Serbia) as the most suitable mediators to facilitate dialogue between the Government of Kosovo and Serbian citizens in Kosovo, with 49 percent of respondents indicating them. Serbian political parties in Kosovo are also viewed as important mediators, with 46 percent of respondents considering them suitable. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Kosovo and Serbia are seen as potential mediators, with 18 percent and 15 percent of respondents indicating them. The EU is mentioned as a potential facilitator of the dialogue by 10 percent of respondents.

49%

Political parties in Serbia (Government of Serbia)

46%

Serbian political parties in Kosovo

26%

Other Kosovo political parties (non-Serbian)

18%

Non-governmental organizations in Kosovo

15%

Non-governmental organizations in Serbia

10%

The EU as a facilitator of the dialogue

2%

No one, the Kosovo government should do it itself

Figure 19. Who should mediate the dialogue between the Government of Kosovo and Serbian citizens of Kosovo?

The data shows notable differences in the preferred mediators for the dialogue between the Government of Kosovo and Serbian citizens of Kosovo between urban and rural areas. Political parties in Serbia (Government of Serbia) are viewed as the most preferred mediator in rural areas, with 59 percent of respondents indicating them, compared to 33 percent in urban areas. Serbian political parties in Kosovo are seen as important mediators by both

urban and rural respondents, with similar percentages indicating them (46% in urban areas and 47% in rural areas). Other Kosovo political parties (non-Serbian) are viewed as a more preferred mediator in urban areas (31%) compared to rural areas (23%).




Figure 20. Who should mediate the dialogue between the Government of Kosovo and Serbian citizens of Kosovo? (Disaggregated by region)

The percentage of respondents who are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the agreements has significantly decreased from 67 percent in Wave 1 to 50 percent in Wave 2. Conversely, there is a notable increase in the percentage of respondents who are unsure about their satisfaction levels, from 27 percent in Wave 1 to 43 percent in Wave 2. The percentage of respondents who are satisfied or very satisfied with the agreements remains relatively low and stable between the two waves.




Figure 21. How satisfied are you with the current agreements achieved by the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue so far?

The most prominent concern is the lack of concrete progress regarding upholding the rights of ethnic minority communities, with 42 percent of respondents indicating this as their primary concern regarding the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process. The lack of proper political representation of Kosovo Serbs in the dialogue process is also a significant concern (37%), followed by the lack of transparency and communication with the public regarding the dialogue is another key concern (34%), and potential violence escalation and destabilization is also a significant concern (32%) of respondents indicating it. Other concerns mentioned include a lack of inclusivity in representing diverse perspectives and interests (13%), delay in implementing agreements reached during the dialogue (11%), and concerns about the influence of external actors on the dialogue process (5%).

The most commonly mentioned external actor is the USA, with n=20 respondents indicating concern about its influence. Other external actors mentioned include Germany (n=11), France (n=6), the EU (n=2), and the UK (n=6).

42%

Lack of concrete progress regarding upholding of the rights of ethnic minority communities

37%

Lack of proper political representation of Kosovo Serbs in the process of the dialogue

34%

Lack of transparency and communication with the public regarding the dialogue

32%

Potential violence escalation and destabilization

13%

Lack of inclusivity in representing diverse perspectives and interests

11%

Delay in implementing agreements reached during the dialogue

5%

Concerns about the influence of external actors on the dialogue process

2%

I don't know/Refuse to answer

Figure 22. What concerns you the most regarding the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process?

These findings highlight the differing concerns between urban and rural areas regarding the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process. In rural areas, the lack of transparency and communication with the public regarding the dialogue is a major concern (41%), compared to 23 percent in urban areas. Potential violence escalation and destabilization is also a significant concern in rural areas, with 41 percent of respondents indicating it, compared to 19 percent in urban areas. The lack of proper political representation of Kosovo Serbs in the process of the dialogue is a concern in both urban and rural areas, but it is slightly higher in urban areas (42%) compared to rural areas (34%).




Figure 23. What concerns you the most regarding the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process? (Disaggregated by settlement)

The percentage of respondents who are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the agreements has significantly decreased from 67 percent in Wave 1 to 50 percent in Wave 2. Conversely, there is a notable increase in the percentage of respondents who are unsure about their satisfaction levels, from 27 percent in Wave 1 to 43 percent in Wave 2. The percentage of respondents who are satisfied or very satisfied with the agreements remains relatively low and stable between the two waves.




Figure 24. Do you expect the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue to improve relations between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs?

Overall, these findings indicate a nuanced perception among respondents regarding the impact of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue on relations between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs among two study waves. While there is still a significant portion of respondents who believe that relations have not changed (48%), there is also a notable portion who believe that relations have either improved (24%) or worsened as a result of the dialogue (27%).




Figure 25. How have the relations between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs changed in the last two years since the beginning of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue?

Trust in State Institutions and Superpowers

Healthcare workers maintain the highest level of trust among respondents, with a score of 2.45 in Wave 1 and 2.25 in Wave 2. The mayor of the municipality and Civil society organizations/ NGOs both experience a significant decrease in trust, with the mayor's trust score dropping from 2.21 to 1.71 and the NGOs' trust score dropping from 2.21 to 1.72. Kosovo Police, Political parties, and Kosovo Courts also experience a decrease in trust, with scores dropping from 2.10 to 1.61, 2.07 to 1.63, and 2.06 to 1.61. The Prime Minister and Kosovo Assembly show the largest decrease in trust, with the Prime Minister's score dropping from 1.98 to 1.46 and the Kosovo Assembly's score dropping from 1.84 to 1.45. The President of Kosovo shows a slight increase in trust, with the score rising from 1.86 to 1.66, although it remains one of the least trusted institutions.

2.45
2.25 Healthcare workers

2.10
1.61 Kosovo Police

2.21
1.71 Mayor of the municipality

2.07
1.63 Political parties

2.21
1.72 Civil society organizations/
NGOs

2.06
1.61 Kosovo Courts



Figure 26. On a scale of 1 to 5, how much do you trust the following institutions?

Overall, the data shows a varied picture of trust in countries and institutions. Russia remains the most trusted entity, with a score of 3.38 in Wave 1 and 3.42 in Wave 2, indicating a slight increase. China also sees an increase, with scores of 3.14 and 3.21 in Wave 1 and Wave 2. KFOR experiences a significant decrease in trust, dropping from 2.65 to 1.66. The EU and NATO both experienced decreases, with scores dropping from 2.48 to 1.61 and 2.18 to 1.48. France, EULEX, and Germany also experience decreases, with scores dropping from 2.19 to 1.79, 2.13 to 1.61, and 2.00 to 1.54. The USA shows the largest decrease, dropping from 2.12 to 1.43. The UN remains one of the least trusted entities overall, scoring 1.71.




Figure 27. On a scale of 1 to 5, how much do you trust the following countries/institutions?

Self-Management Framework

When the respondents were asked about the level of familiarity with the content of the Self-Management Framework/Association of Serbian Municipalities, the majority, 64 percent, indicated being somewhat familiar with the content, suggesting a basic understanding, meanwhile a notable proportion, 22 percent, reported being not very familiar. Nine percent expressed being very familiar with the content, signifying a deeper level of knowledge, while on the other hand a small minority, five percent, stated not being familiar at all.

- 5%
Not familiar at all
- 22%
Not very familiar
- 64%
Somewhat familiar

9%
Very familiar

1%
DK/NR

Figure 28. To what extent are you familiar with the content of Self-Management Framework/Association of Serbian Municipalities?

When we look at the results from the two different periods, we notice that people’s opinions about establishing the Self-Management framework for municipalities with mostly Serb populations have also changed. In Wave 1, a significant majority, 84 percent, were in favor of its establishment, while only 12 percent were against it. However, in Wave 2, while the majority still favored it, the proportion decreased to 73 percent, and the opposition increased to 23 percent.




Figure 29. Are you for or against the establishment of the Self-Management framework of municipalities with a majority of Serbs?

The data on the figure below depicts a range of viewpoints on the establishment of the Self-Management framework in municipalities with a majority of Serbs in Kosovo. A notable majority, 70 percent, view the framework as providing more rights and opportunities for the Serbian community, while 59 percent see it as a positive step towards reconciliation between Serbian and Albanian communities. Additionally, 58 percent believe it promotes better interethnic cooperation and stability. The percentage of the respondents in the targeted municipalities that view the establishment of the Self-Management Framework or the Association of Serbian Municipalities as a violation of the sovereignty of Kosovo, or as something that would undermine the authority of the central government of Kosovo is 18 percent, respectively.




Figure 30. How do you perceive the creation of the Self-Management framework in municipalities with the majority of Serbs in Kosovo?

Moreover, the survey responses show that the top three priorities for the Self-Management framework of municipalities with a majority of Serbs or the Association of Serbian Municipalities are centered around improving employment and economic conditions, enhancing general public security and stability, and ensuring the quality of educational services. With 55 percent of respondents prioritizing the improvement of job opportunities and economic well-being, 43 percent emphasizing the importance of enhancing public safety and stability, and 32 percent highlighting the need for better educational services, these areas emerge as critical focal points for addressing the needs and aspirations of the Serbian community within these municipalities.

55%
Improvement of employment and economic conditions

43%
Improvement of general public security/ stability

32%
Quality of educational services

27%
Quality of health services

26%
Integration of Serbs into Kosovo society

23%
Cultural and sports activities

- 17% Minority rights protection
- 16% Cultural heritage preservation
- 14% Political representation and participation
- 11% Protection of religious freedoms

Figure 31. What issues should the Self-Management framework of municipalities with a majority of Serbs/Association of Serbian Municipalities deal with?

Future in Kosovo

Comparing the results from the two waves, there is a noticeable shift in perceptions regarding the future of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. In Wave 1 that took place in July – August 2023, 36 percent of respondents believed that inter-ethnic relations would improve, while 33 percent thought they would worsen, with 30 percent expecting them to remain the same. However, in Wave 2, the perception changed, with 28 percent anticipating improvement, 16 percent expecting worsening, and a notable increase to 52 percent foreseeing that relations would remain the same.




Figure 32. Five years from now, what do you think the inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo will be?

The subsequent data illustrates shifts in visitation frequency to various cities or urban areas over two waves. Generally, there is a trend towards increased non-visitation or decreased visitation frequency in Wave 2 compared to Wave 1. Cities like Prishtina, Prizren, Gjilan, Kamenice, Peje, South Mitrovica, Ferizaj, Vushtri, and Gjakova all show this pattern. Notably, in Wave 2, there is a significant rise in non-visitation to Prishtina, Prizren, Gjilan, and Kamenice, while Peje and Ferizaj also experience notable increases in non-visitation. Conversely, South Mitrovica sees an increase in frequent visitation, but this is not consistent across all cities.

	Pristina		Prizren		Gjilan Gnjilane		Kamenicë Kamenica		Pejë Peç		South Mitrovica		Ferizaj Uroševac		Vushtrri Vuçitër		Gjakova Đakovica	
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 1	Wave 2
Never	11%	33%	23%	50%	24%	49%	31%	52%	41%	50%	31%	25%	39%	56%	47%	54%	56%	61%
Rarely	33%	45%	39%	37%	33%	21%	35%	23%	34%	29%	32%	48%	32%	6%	30%	30%	24%	3%
Sometimes	45%	16%	32%	11%	28%	17%	22%	16%	19%	17%	22%	23%	20%	14%	8%	14%	16%	13%
Often	11%	6%	6%	1%	13%	12%	11%	8%	6%	3%	15%	2%	9%	3%	4%	2%	4%	2%

Figure 33. In the past 12 months, how frequently have you visited the cities or urban areas listed below?

But what drives frequent or occasional visits to the cities listed above? The data suggests that shopping is the primary reason for both Wave 1 and Wave 2, with approximately 79 percent and 80 percent of respondents citing it, respectively. Following shopping, business and networking opportunities are mentioned by 28 percent in Wave 1 and slightly decrease to 26 percent in Wave 2. Cultural and arts festivals are also a factor for some, with 15 percent in Wave 1 and 14 percent in Wave 2. However, interest in vibrant nightlife seems to decline from 7 percent in Wave 1 to 3 percent in Wave 2. Overall, shopping seems to be the main motivator for visiting these cities, followed by business opportunities, cultural events, and, to a lesser extent, nightlife.




Figure 34. What are the main reasons for visiting often or from time to time the cities above?

People that expressed that they visited rarely or never, were further asked to determine the factors that deter them from visiting the cities listed. According to the data, safety concerns emerge as the primary deterrent, with a decrease from 45 percent in Wave 1 to 40 percent in Wave 2 expressing this sentiment. Following safety concerns, limited business and networking opportunities are mentioned by 40 percent in Wave 1 and slightly decrease to 33 percent in Wave 2. Similarly, limited shopping alternatives are also a significant deterrent,

with 36 percent in Wave 1 and 31 percent in Wave 2 expressing this concern. Interestingly, there is an increase in respondents mentioning limited cultural immersion as a reason, rising from 14 percent in Wave 1 to 19 percent in Wave 2.



Figure 35. What are the main reasons for not visiting the cities above?

The following results present perceptions of the level of obstacle, rated on a scale of 1 to 5, regarding having neighbors from various communities in two waves of the data collection. Generally, respondents across both waves indicate relatively low perceived obstacles, with most ratings falling within the lower range of the scale. Comparing Wave 1 to Wave 2, there is an evident trend towards decreased perceived obstacles across all listed communities, albeit subtle. Notably, while communities like Ashkali, Egyptian, Turk, and Roma demonstrate significant reductions in perceived obstacles in Wave 2, the perceived obstacle for having Albanian neighbors remains relatively stable, with a slight decrease from 2.50 in Wave 1 to 2.40 in Wave 2. Despite this modest decline, Albanians are consistently perceived to have a moderate level of obstacles compared to other communities listed. For instance, in Wave 2, the perceived obstacles for having Ashkali, Egyptian, Turk, and Roma neighbors are notably lower than for Albanians. Goran and Bosnian communities also exhibit decreases in perceived obstacles, though less pronounced.




Figure 36. On a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is 'not at all' and 5 is 'very'), how much of an obstacle would it be for you to have neighbors from the following communities?

Furthermore, the respondents were asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 5, their perceived obstacles of working with members from various communities. Overall, respondents report low perceived obstacles, with most ratings low. Comparing the waves, there is a trend of decreased perception of obstacles across communities, notably for Egyptian, Turk, Ashkali, and Roma. For instance, obstacles for Egyptians decreased from 2.15 in Wave 1 to 1.71 in Wave 2. Conversely, obstacles for Albanians remain stable, slightly decreasing from 2.38 to 2.29. Despite this, working in the same environment with Albanians are consistently seen to have a moderate perception of obstacle level from the respondents compared to others.




Figure 37. On a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is 'not at all' and 5 is 'very'), how much of an obstacle would it be for you to work in the same work environment with members from the following communities?

Sentiment towards CBK's decision on currency

When asked in what currency they usually receive their personal or family income or the currency they make the day-to-day transactions, data indicates that the Dinar currency is predominantly used for both personal/family incomes and day-to-day expenses, but Euro follows closely when it comes to expenditures. Specifically, 89 percent of respondents reported receiving their incomes in Dinars, while 92 percent stated that they usually make their day-to-day expenses in Dinars as well. Euros are also commonly used at 63 percent for expenses, albeit to a lesser extent when it comes to income with 22 percent of respondents receiving incomes in euros. Other currencies such as pounds, Swiss francs, and rubles were not reported for either incomes or expenses, indicating a predominant use of Dinars and euros for financial transactions among the surveyed population.




Figure 38. In what currency do you usually receive your personal/ family incomes? / In what currency do you usually make your day-to-day personal/ family expenses?

When the data is broken down by region, the responses provide insight into differences in currency usage between income and expenses in both the Rest and North regions in the targeted municipalities with a majority of Serbian population. In the Rest Region, Dinars are the primary currency used for receiving their income, comprising 68 percent, closely followed by Euro at 53 percent. However, for day-to-day expenses, Euros dominate at 82 percent, slightly surpassing Dinar at 77 percent. In contrast, in the North Region, Dinar dominates for both incomes and expenses, with 96 percent for both transactions.

	Incomes		Expenses	
Rest	€	53%	€	82%
	RSD	68%	RSD	77%
North	€	12%	€	58%
	RSD	96%	RSD	96%

Figure 39. In what currency do you usually receive your personal/ family incomes? / In what currency do you usually make your day-to-day personal/ family expenses? (Disaggregated by region)

The following responses from the targeted municipalities reflect the perceptions regarding the impact of the latest regulations by the Central Bank of Kosovo, which recognize the euro as the sole official currency for transactions in the country. Almost half of the respondents (48 percent) feel that these regulations significantly affect their day-to-day transactions, while 21 percent believe they have some extent of impact. On the other hand, 20 percent feel that the regulations do not affect them at all, and lastly, 11 percent either did not know or did not provide a response. Among those that reported that this regulation affects them, a number of them reported that Dinar is the only currency in which they receive the money, and that they have to do transactions in Serbia.

48%
It affects me a lot

21%
It affects me to some extent

20%
It does not affect me at all

11%
I don't know/I have no answer

Figure 40. Does the latest regulations of the Central Bank of Kosovo regarding currency (recognizing EURO as the only official currency for transactions in the country) affects your day-to-day transactions?

The respondents were further asked about the anticipated attitudes of their community towards complying with the latest currency regulations, highlighting other aspects of policy implications in the long-run, 43 percent, expect resistance to compliance, due to cultural or political reasons. Conversely, 36 percent believe that the community will be willing to comply with the regulations for economic convenience. However, a notable 21 percent express uncertainty about the community’s future attitude. These results suggest a nuanced understanding of the potential challenges and motivations underlying the community’s attitude towards currency regulation, highlighting the complex interplay of economic, cultural, and political dynamics.




Figure 41. In the long term, what do you think would be the attitude of your community towards complying with the latest regulation regarding currencies?

The data, disaggregated by age, indicates a spectrum of attitudes towards compliance with the latest currency regulations across different age groups. While there are noticeable differences, certain patterns emerge. Younger respondents (18-24, 25-34, and 35-44) are more likely to believe that their community will comply for economic convenience, with 30 percent, 39 percent and 41 percent respectively holding this view. However, as age increases beyond this range, the proportion of those believing in compliance for economic convenience declines. Conversely, there is a trend of increasing resistance due to cultural or political reasons as age increases. Among respondents aged 55-64, a significant majority (52 percent) express resistance based on cultural or political reasons, compared to 34 percent among those aged 18-24. Lastly, uncertainty about their community’s attitude towards compliance peaks among respondents aged 65 and above, with 58 percent indicating uncertainty or lack of knowledge.




Figure 42. In the long term, what do you think would be the attitude of your community towards complying with the latest regulation regarding currencies? (Disaggregated by Age)

In addition, respondents were asked about their perceptions for the future and the following responses indicate the perceived likelihood of people in the community adopting the euro for their day-to-day transactions. Almost two thirds of the respondents, or 64 percent, believe it is likely or very likely (47% and 17% respectively). Conversely, only 10 percent find it unlikely or very unlikely (6% and 3% respectively). However, a significant proportion, 26 percent, remain unsure about the future adoption of the euro.



Figure 43. In your community, how likely are people to adopt EURO for their day-to-day transactions in the future?

When this data is broken down by settlement (urban vs. rural), the results reveal differences in perceptions regarding the adoption of the Euro for day-to-day transactions. Urban respondents are more optimistic about the likelihood of Euro adoption, with 77 percent (24% very likely and 53% likely) expressing confidence, compared to 56 percent (13% very likely and 43% likely) of rural respondents. Conversely, uncertainty is more prevalent among rural respondents, with 31 percent being unsure compared to 19 percent in urban areas. Regarding skepticism, rural respondents are more inclined towards unlikelihood, with 13 percent (8% unlikely and 5% very unlikely) expressing doubt, while only 4 percent of urban respondents hold similar sentiments.




Figure 44. In your community, how likely are people to adopt EURO for their day-to-day transactions in the future? (Disaggregated by Settlement)

CONCLUSIONS

The findings of the study shed light on the challenges faced by the Serbian community residing in Kosovo, encompassing various spheres of daily life and governance. The survey data underscores a multitude of pressing concerns, prominently including issues related to security/stability, political freedom, and economic conditions. Notably, corruption emerges as a significant challenge in the realm of political freedom and democracy, alongside issues such as political interventions and electoral integrity. Furthermore, the disparities in perceived challenges between urban and rural areas highlight complex variations of community dynamics within Kosovo, underscoring the importance of context-specific approaches to addressing these challenges.

The study also delves into perceptions surrounding the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, revealing a divided sentiment regarding its efficacy and impact on interethnic relations. While there is a recognition of the dialogue's importance and potential, concerns persist regarding transparency, political representation, and concrete progress. The nuanced perceptions regarding dialogue stakeholders and topics for discussion underscore the complexity of reconciliation efforts in the region. Additionally, the fluctuations in trust levels towards state institutions and superpowers reflect a dynamic socio-political landscape, necessitating sustained efforts to foster trust and confidence among the Serbian community in Kosovo.

Regarding the familiarity with the Self-Management Framework/Association of Serbian Municipalities reveal a mixed level of familiarity among respondents. While a majority indicated at least some familiarity with the content, a notable proportion reported being not very familiar or not familiar at all. This suggests a need for further dissemination of information about the framework to ensure wider understanding and engagement among the population.

The shifting attitudes towards the establishment of the Self-Management framework for municipalities with a majority of Serb populations underscore the evolving dynamics within the community. Although a majority still supports its establishment, there has been a notable decrease in support and an increase in opposition over time. These changes may reflect a deeper scrutiny and analysis among the population regarding the implications and effectiveness of such a framework, indicating the importance of ongoing dialogue and consultation in shaping community decisions and policies.

Lastly, opinions on the Central Bank of Kosovo's currency decision depict a nuanced landscape. While nearly half of respondents feel affected, attitudes toward compliance vary. Some anticipate resistance due to cultural or political reasons, while others foresee compliance driven by economic convenience. These findings emphasize the complex interplay between economic, cultural, and political factors in shaping public sentiment and behavior regarding currency regulation.

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