Is Kurti’s call to Kosovo Serbs for an internal dialogue an indecent offer?

The formation of, in all likelihood, the second Government of Albin Kurti coincides with the marking of the tenth anniversary since in Brussels the term “dialogue” became a buzzword in Serbian-Albanian relations. As the “dialogue” has not yet led to an agreement on “normalization”, which is another concept that excessive daily political use turns into a cliché, it was expected that Kurti, as the candidate for the Prime Minister of Kosovo, would take a stand about its fate. Contrary to the expectations of Western diplomats, who in their post-election congratulations expressed the hope for a speedy continuation of the dialogue with Belgrade, Kurti announced that his Government would have other priorities. Such an attitude, however, does not imply that the future Prime Minister of Kosovo does not see himself as a politician of the “dialogue”. Similar to the victory in the 2019 elections, Kurti announced the inception of an internal dialogue with the Kosovo Serbs.

The satirical tone of the introductory paragraph is not intended to underestimate the advantages that dialogue holds as a problem-solving approach. A commitment to the dialogue presents a desirable behavior of any Balkan politician. Opposite of the dialogue and the consensus-building is the unilateral imposition of will, often violently, which the history of Serbian-Albanian relations is deeply burdened with. However, in order for the dialogue to be genuine and effective, it must be based on certain principles. This is the first test that Kurti’s initiative must pass.

Even though the Serb List (Srpska lista) in the recently held elections retained all the 10 seats that are in the Assembly of Kosovo guaranteed for the representatives of the Serb community, the invitation to participate in the internal dialogue will probably not reach it. According to Kurti’s assessment, this political party does not represent the interests of the Kosovo Serbs, but of the official Belgrade, and, therefore, has no place in the internal dialogue.

Although it is difficult to dispute the claim that in Serb areas in Kosovo there is no political pluralism and the real opportunity to choose, it is even more difficult to seek legitimate Serb representatives other than those supported by the electorate. If the election results are accepted as a benchmark, the only alternative for the Serb List could be the civic initiatives of the United Community led by Adrijana Hodžić and the Roma Initiative led by Gazmen Salijević. These are the only lists that have managed to “attract” a number of former Serb List voters in Serbian areas. However, following the decision of the Central Election Commission and of the Supreme Court to annul the votes these lists won in Serb-majority municipalities, neither the option to invite them to participate in the dialogue as Serb representatives of Kosovo would be legitimate.

The satirical tone that characterizes the previous paragraph is intended to compensate for the bolder assessments of this situation, which should be stated regarding the actions of the Serbian List and the mentioned institutions. These comments will await another occasion, as events related to the election of representatives of the Bosnian and Roma communities are topics about which are yet to be written about.

If a view that the Serb List is not the real representative of the Kosovo Serbs is accepted, then the issue of who should represent the Serb community in the internal dialogue remains unresolved. It seems that the solution that Kurti is likely to pursue is to choose himself the interlocutors from the Serbian side. Such an action, however, would violate one of the basic principles of any dialogue, which assumes that each party chooses its own representatives. Furthermore, such an approach would echo the former practice of the Belgrade authorities to seek “honest Albanians”. The interlocutors that Kurti would choose would be those who, according to their attitudes, are closer to him, and not necessarily to the attitudes held by the majority of Serbs in Kosovo. One of the likely candidates is Nenad Rašić.

Despite the rhetorical refusal to cooperate with the Serb List, Kurti will not be able to circumvent the constitutional obligation to include in the new Government the ministers it proposes. A similar scenario was seen in 2020, during the formation of Kurti’s first Government. Accordingly, it would be logical to assume that the Assembly and the Government could represent a suitable setting for an internal dialogue. However, since Kurti is not interested in closer relations with ministers and MPs from the Serb List, the dialogue he has in mind will likely take place outside the institutions. His statement on promoting cooperation between Albanian and Serbian farmers is in that vein.

In rejecting the institutions of the system as an appropriate framework for the dialogue, populist elements, which are not unknown to Kurti’s political activity, are noticeable. Such an attitude consistently expresses the belief that there is no need for procedures and institutions to exist between him and the citizens, when he as a leader is able to directly hear the will of the people. However, for the Serbian side it is more important, but also riskier, that the long-term rejection of the Ahtisaari plan and Brussels process by Vetëvendosje is packaged within the call for internal dialogue.

The Ahtisaari Plan, which is the basis of Kosovo’s legal order, arguably sets out the highest degree of rights that minority communities can enjoy in the Balkans. Except for its solution regarding the status, the plan largely met the expectations of the Serbian side in terms of the internal organization of Kosovo. The Vetëvendosje Movement remained outside the basic consensus which was established among the relevant Albanian political actors and rejected the Ahtisaari plan, considering that the concessions it was making to the Serbian side were overly generous. The Vetëvendosje Movement took a similar stance towards the Brussels process and the agreements.

The dilemma that arises for the Serb community in Kosovo about accepting the call for an internal dialogue outside the institutions concerns the respect for the existing rights and guarantees. The hidden agenda with which Kurti is entering into internal dialogue pertains to the aim of showing that the complex framework which regulates the relations between the majority and the minorities in Kosovo, is redundant. Albanians and Serbs do not need confusing institutional solutions that foreigners designed, when they can solve problems and reach agreements outside them. It is not only the Serb List that has no place in the internal dialogue, but the guaranteed positions of the representatives of the Serb community in the Assembly and the Government are also unnecessary. When it is shown that the existing guarantees are not needed, then the demand for amending the Constitution, which will remove the obstacles for Kosovo to enter new state forms, is not far off either.

Questioning the existing rights and guarantees, Kurti paradoxically approaches Belgrade’s stance that the authorities in Kosovo present “provisional institutions”. On the other hand, the behavior of the Serbian side which views the Ahtisaari plan as a “buffet” from which it can cherry-pick what it likes also works in the favor of the intentions of Vetëvendosje to request a review of the existing arrangements. At the same time, the Serb List, with its behavior regarding the election of the Bosnian and Roma representatives, provided additional space to raise the question of whether institutional mechanisms for the protection of non-majority communities are subject to misuse. All this shows that the issue of the framework for the internal dialogue and the principles on which it should be based has not been solved yet.

In order for the dialogue, whether it takes place in Brussels or Prishtina, to lead to the resolution of open issues, the process must be based on clearly stated principles. One of the basic principles is that each party selects the representatives who will represent them. The second condition is that dialogue should not be used as an excuse or an opportunity to question the attained level of rights and guarantees. And finally, but most importantly, both the Serbian and Albanian sides must accept that dialogue in itself means little if the agreements it leads to are not implemented in good faith.

Within Kosovo Collective Op-Ed series

Opinions expresses in this oped series do not necessarily represent those of the Balkan Trust for Democracy, the German Mashall Fund of the U.S. (BTD), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), or the U.S. Government. 

Project is supported by the Balkan Trust for Democracy of the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. and USAID.